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An account of en election undoubtedly benefits 
f'rom the perspective view that may be gained with the lapse 
of fif'teen years, but it also suf'f'ered from the disappear-
ance of documentary material, and from the loss or atmos-
phere. A participant in the 1935 election in New Zealand 
might have been better able to judge the state of' that 
elusive quality - public opinion, than one who has to rely 
partly on others' recollections in tranquillity( or the 
emotions stirred then. 
There are, of course, newspapers and other 
journals to mirror the f'eelings of the times, but in elect-
ion campaigns their reflections are not relisble, because 
they too have political opinions. Nevertheless, though 
partial to the government, the newspapers must be the main 
source of' inf'ormation on electoral activities, since only 
they provide a continuous commentary. While recognising 
the important part played by newspapers in elections, I 
have attempted to correct their distortion of the political 
picture by references to as many other sources as possible. 
There have been difficulties in making a bal8nced study 
since the lapse of time hs s removed much valuable material. 
Only the Labour Party off'ice staf'f could })elp 
much with source ms.terial - the P,amphlets, posters and 
vi. 
literature of' ephemerel velue. The Nationel Party's 
Head Of'f'ice was not opened until 1936. Having been de-
:feated in the 1935 election, they faced a much altered 
situation, so that possibly, the election material used in 
the previous year seemed i rreleve.nt. Certainly nothing 
was kept. The same problem exists in relation to the 
Democrat Party1 which was soon disbanded, and the Connnunist 
Part~ which had no resources or sta:f:f for storing re:ference 
material. The printing o:ff'ices which produced the cam-
paign literature had no samples f'or inspection. Appar-
ently they keep election material :for three year•s only 
(the time between elections). 
By contrast, at the Lebour Party's Wellington 
of:fice, there are large bundles of' pamphlets, newspaper 
clippings, advertising literature and similar material for 
each election and for the years between. Whereas with 
in:formation about the Labour Party, the problem was to sift 
and prune, with other organised parties and the lesser 
groups and Independents the difficulty was to build up 
fragmentary gleanings into an adequate assessment. Much 
use:ful literature, similar to that which the Labour Party 
has, could probably be obtained from the Democrat organiser 
and others like him, who as yet have not made BV8ilable 
papers stored in basements. Even libraries have not made 
systerr1Jatic collections of' election li tera.ture until a.ft er 
I 
1935, and very little supplementary material has been de-
vii. 
posi tea. with them by gift or bequest .. 
EveI'Y ef'fort was made to assist me in my research/ 
by the staffs of the General Assembly Library and the Turn-
bull I.1ibrary, and of the Wellington B.nd Christchurch city 
libraries. My thenks are due to these members for theil" 
ready assistance. I nm especially grateful for the help 
and courtesy I received from those connected with the 
National, I1abour o.nd Democrat orgsni set ions and for their 
entr•usting rne with r·ecords which could be used in a partisan 
spirit. 
l owe much to the he1p obtained from two texts 
dealing with British electoral org2nisation~~ ilParlia-
mentary Representation", by J .111. 8. Ross\ and "The British 
General Election of 191l5"j by H.B. McCallum and A. Readrnan. 
There were no comparable New Zealsnd studies to assist me, 
so. thBt much of the guidance for the nature of' the invest .... 
igation and the form of the resultant thesis ceme from 
these two bookso 
There are, of course, differences between the two 
countries' electoral arrangements, compelling a New Zeal~ 
and observer to follow his own lines of research. He 
must also recognise that the emphasis in political thought 
in each country lies in different planes. In 1935 the 
campaign was concentrated on the economic or•gani sat ion of 
the country, with the topic of guaranteed prices dominating 
viii. 
all other issues. 
The accent on party and policy tends to disgu~se 
the part played by the pu.blic in deciding the f'inal issue 
of accepting or rejecting what was offered. The elector 
can not be forgotten, however. The student must attempt 
to bring all the forces at workf in to clear focus and 
from the combination of causes end results make a comp_lete 
picture. He may not be able to explain, as election 
results are generally mystifying, and is certainly not ex-
pected to vindicate them,. but having begun the work of 
clarification, mey leeve the rest of' the task to history. 
ix. 
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THE DEVELOEMl@IT OF THE STRUGGLE. 
Of all the elections in New Zealand's political history, 
only two qualify for the adjective momentouse In 1890 and in 
-
1935, Governments came to power whose vigour e.nd liberalism were 
not only to alter the lives of their. contemporar•ies, but also 
to make changes ths.t had continual repercussions in this country 
and echoes in other nations' handling of social problems. 
'rhe Liberal and Labour Governments followed on after 
the collapse of regimes which were predomine.ntly Conservative, 
and which were dogged in their last years by trying economic 
conditions and precarious political rearrangements. Neither 
regime was memorable for enlightened legislation and no leader 
had the personal popularity of the leading figur•es tn the sue-
ceeding Cabinets - Seddon and Savage. Other Governments had 
fallen victims to depression crises, had been jostled out by a 
multiplicity of vote - splitting candidates and had alienated 
1. In addition to the texts mentioned in the footnotes, 







tlNeY! Zealand .. 11 
History of the British 1~mpire, Vol,. 
VII, Part II, 11 New Zeal8nd". 
11 Bri ta in and New ZealancP1 .. 
11From 'rrack to Highway11 • 
"Round Table 11 , 1928-19 35. 
11 li ew Zeal e.nd 11 • 
11Unders~6.nding New Zealandtt., 
their habitual supporters, but no government had aroused against 
itself such general opposition as did the Coalition of 1931-5. 
The Labour Party might claim the election victory as their own 
triumph but this was not acknowledging how much momentum they 
had gained from the efforts .of those intent only on pushing out 
the Coalitione 
The National Government had been the unhappy result of 
minority groupings in the House and of unprec.edented financial 
problems, which neither of the two experienced parties felt 
capable of solving alone. The politice.l difficulties had 
appeared even before the economic ones, and it will be necessary 
to review briefly the period up to the.onset of the depression 
in 1931 .. 
Aft er their period in power from 1 ~90 to 1912 the 
Liberals suffered eclipse just as their British counterparts didm 
Brief returns to Government benches wer·e made by Liberal leaders 
during the War Coalition, but the Reform Pa_rty continued in 
power until 1928. During the tw~~ty-six years of this aa_minis= 
tration, the Liberals had the position of official Opposition but 
in latter years it was the Labour Party, then in adolescent 
growth, which took the lead in criticism. 
In 1928 there was an unexpected rejuvenation of the age-
ing Liberal Party. Under a new name, "United-", and with the 
infusion of Independent blood, it was able to take office again. 
This position came about because of the Reform and Liberal 
parties' refusal to sink their minor differences and unite, as 
often urged by newspapers and other publications. There was, 
however, .sufficient difference between the two older par-ti es to 
cause Labour to prefer to give its support to United when it held 
the balance between theme Labour liked neither of their intend~ 
ed progr•ammes but liked Reform' s ·least .. 
The United Party's precarious balancing act could only 
be successful while Bir Joseph Ward was the chief performere 1" 
But he had not long to live and the leadership went to G. w. 
For·bes, 2.. who he.d neither the personality nor popularity of 
his old chief .. At the election on the death of Ward and at 
others later, there was a definite disavowal by the two chief 
parties of any intention of uniting. It was certainly not in 
the interests- .of Reform to team up with the failing Liberal 
remnants. 
The Labour Party, too, were waiting to step into the 
dying man's shoes. They were bitterly disappointed at the turn 
of economic events which necessitated a Reform-United fusion in 
1931. The pressure of the world crises forced both of these 
parties to the panicky conclusion that the situation was too 
1. 1.1The surprise victory at the general election in November, 
1928, which brought Sir Joseph Ward into office was un-
mistakably a one-man victorye 11 "Round Table", No .. 79, p .. 658. 
2. 11 Though representing an obscure country electorate the Premie:t•~ 
ship went to Mr. Geo1"'ge Forbes - a man without vision.11 
personality or dynamies0 • A. J. Stallworthy, in a letter 
to the writer. 
difficult to tackle alonea Before the election in that year, 
each party agreed to go under its own leadership to the polls, 
but gave assurances that sitting members would not be subjected 
to opposition f'rom the other party. The result of this arrange-
ment was a Coalition Government, from which Labour was exclnc1ed 
by its own refusal to participate. Having twenty-four Labour 
politicians on the sidelines, aggressively confident that they 
could do better, made the Coalition team most uneasy, but the 
political difficulties of governing during a depression were 
trif"ling beside the economic problems .. 
The depression began for New Zealand when p_rices fo1 .. 
wool, butter and meat fell between 1930 and 1931, bringing many 
farmers to the verge of bankruptcy. The effect of this was 
quickly passed on to others in the connnu.nity. Unemployment in-
creased, diminishing spending power and leading to further dis-
missals. For a time some unemployed men were absorbed into 
. 1. 
-Public works, but unfox·~unately these soon had to be contracted 
because the Governm~at decided to economise. Lowered incomes 
had causea. a diminution of revenue just when greateI' State ex~ 
penditure was expected of the Coalition. That the victims of 
the depression should look for help from public funds was natural 
in a people nUJ.ttured by t_he optimism of Vogel and the Seddo:n:iJan 
social service..l' but these were not days or boom and borrow., 
This was a depression. Even if it had been possible to borrow 
from Londony it would have been inadvisable while export prices 
were so low. If the Government had, wished to borrow internally 
1@ Sutch, "Poverty and Progress in New Zealand", p. 133e 
it would have had to adopt the policy of guaranteeing productive 
and economic work at proper wages to keep up spending power and 
stimulate a greater demand for goods to ensure continued and 
increasing work for people and a surplus available for National 
loans. 
But this was not the policy adoptedo The Finance 
Minister 1 • was a.etermined. to have a balanced Budget, so that Mra 
Coates, Minister of Unemployment, had to match cuts in pensions 
and pivil servants' salaries with reduction of public works 
expenditure. 
One solution of the Government's shortage of funds was 
to relieve the farmers sufficiently to enable them to contribu.te 
again to the Treasury. Nothing could be done about the over-
seas prices for primary products, which showed no improvement 
until 1934. Internally, however, farm costs could be lowered • 
To this end a stay on farm debts was declared, by various Acts 
ending with the Rural Mortgagors Final Adjustment Act, 1935. 
Other palliatives were statutory reductions of interest rates 
and rents and finally the raising of the exchange rate in January 
1933·- measures which embittered the business community0 2• 
1 •. William Downie Stewart (Dunedin West) .. 
2. A., ,J. Stallworthy, M. P. for the Eden electorate in Auckland 
City, 1928 to 1935, is their spokesman when he says (in a 
letter to the writer 24-7-48), "Mortgages, Govt. stocks, 
interest rates and :financial obligations a.nd contracts 
were ruthlessly assailed in the most arbitrary manner by 
the Government, which should have been the keeper of the 
nation's conscience." 
Yet their grievances did not go unnoticede While the 
Goverrunent continued to reduce its own expenditure, it approved 
lowered wage costs for industry, but concealed among the jam was 
the medici11-e of' sales tax - a source of irritation to the con-
sumer and so a limitation on profits for the businessman. 
\11/hereas faYmers and businessmen expected to stF~ggle 
on until times were better, the working-class, and especially the 
urban worke_r, was not so self-reliant. He had no financial 
backing and generally no surplus or reserve funds .. He looked 
to the Government for protection, but was answered by wage-
reduction when the Arbitration Act was amendede This was done 
in response to a demand by the :t'armere Arbitration Court 
awards had not yet been extended to the farm-worker but "there 
were awards for shearers, freezi ng~works employees and some othe1•s 
and the farmers claimed that the cost of distributing servicesg 
of f'arm supplies, and of .0-overnment were affected by the d.eter-
minations of the Court. tt 1 • Their demands were successful a111d 
revision of private wage contracts followed. The business 
community did not now hasten to uphold the "sanctity of contract" .. 
The unions, which did, 2 had no strength or resources to fight 
with and the working-class man preferred reduced wages to strikes 
at a time when he could soon be replaced from the :r•anks of the 
unernployed. 
If he lost his job, the best he could hope for was part= 
time employment on Public Works schemes or relief work, probably 
1. Morrell, t1NewZealand 11 1 Po 181. 
2e Beaglehole, "New Zealand", p.101. 
having to go away from his home to earn the meagre allowance. 
He might go as subsidized labour to e. farmer, or be assisted to 
prospect for gold, but if he was unfit for vigorous work, or was 
one of the thousands for whom, by 1933, there was nothing to do 
even in relief' work, the Government's principle of 11 No pay with-
out wor•k11 forced him to seek charity fr-om hard-pressed city 
authorities whose inadequacies were mitiga~ed by private generos-
ity. The situation was unpleasant enough for men, but parttc-
ularly galling for women workers, for they were not eligible f'or 
State assistance and yet, while earning, had to pay unemployment 
tax. 
Early in 1932, dissatisfaction among the unemployed had 
showed itself in riots.in Aucklando 10 Although this resulted 
in an increase in allowances, it was not till 1934 that the prin-
ciple of' 0 No pay without work0 was relinqutshed, and sustenance 
was given to all those who needed it. Even then there were 
needy people noted by Sutch, 
J 
2 
· ttwho had not registered for 
relief because of pride or a pauper income. 0 
So widespread was the suffering and dissatisfaction that 
despite the Coalition's well-intentioned efforts to reduce the 
economic chaos, their popularfty was at its lowest ebb in 1933 
and scarcely recovered any ground before the elections 
1 e Harrop in "New Zealand After Five Wars 0 , p. 91+, thought 
it "incredible that better ways of employing available 
labour could not have been devised. tt 
2. Sutch, "The Quest for Security in New Zealandu, Po 121. 
1933 was the year of the~ Legion's mushroom 
growth - a spontaneous movement to influence Parliamentary rep-
x•esentati on, but with no. political affiliations and no sense of' 
directions By this time too, many farmers had become easy con-
vert s to 11 economic heresj.estt. After the shock of seeing their 
incomes dwind.le away, they had plunged into controversial deeps 
with Major Douglas. Their demand for monetar•y r•e:form was "so 
insistent" 1. that the Cabinet sought relief in a Parliamentary 
Monetary Corfill1i tt eee The squall of publicity connected with 
tlhis controversy and the widely-read Parlimnentary reports pre-
pared the way for the farmers' progress from Social Credit to 
acceptance of Labour's programmee 
By the end of its extended term, 2, the Coalition had 
offended most sections of the people in varying degrees. The 
farmers now had the least to complain of but they were disappoint= 
ed at having to accept quota restrictions on meat exports to 
British markets and had been inci tea. to disloyalty by monetary 
reformer-s. Certain of the farmer•s, moreover, felt little grat-
itude for the alteration to the exchange rate, which came too 
late to help, the benefits going to the stock-and-station agents 
who had been financing theme 3° 
1.. J. H. Penniket, in a letter to the writer 3-7=49, states that 
"every electorate in the south of Auckland had several 
branches of' monetary reformers actively campaigning". See 
also Beaglehole, "New Zealandtt ~ Po 103., 
2. The period of officeAwas extended by one year ostensibly as 
a measure of economy but more probably to allow the counti--y 
to recover from the despairing anger of 1933e 
3. Penniket, ·aocs cit., recalls the case of a returned soldier 
farmer on a. bttdget from 8. stock compa.ny. ttHis wife and 
family vrnre allowed fif't·een shillings s. week on which to 
live... and the only fresh meat they got was eels 8.nd rab-
bi ts caught on the farm, yet there were about 800 sheep on 
that f'arm and some cattle, but of course tliey were all se-
cured to the stock company" o Morrell in "Contemporary 
Reviewtt, 1936, p., 335, mentions similar grievances. 
8. 
Many city people, ill-acquainted with the problems of 
the depressed export trade in primary produce, complained of the 
Government's preroccupation with Meat Boards, exchange rate, 
Dairy Commissions and Imperial tariff revisions. Risking its 
political life by faithfully kee;ping New Zealand's exports o:f 
beef down to the quot·a set by the British Government, the New 
Zealand Government was often betrayed by abrupt changes of policy 
in Britain and by blundering advice :from the Meat Board heree 
Some of the criticisms were only surface swirls or pet-
ulance, which disappeared with the return of prosperity, but be-
neath these flowed through the whole country a current of resent-
ment at the social results of the Government's administration= 
seen in the rne.lnutri ti on of children and the treatment of unem-
ployed. By London standards the depression measures had been 
successful in that the New Zealand Governuent had put its fin-
ancial house in order, but New Zeale.nd opinion held that it was 
the work of visionless lJlen to end their cri tice_l period of' office 
with a surplus in the unemployrnent :fund when there were still 
over 50,000 1• men out of work. It appeared that the Government 
was more concerned to keep fina.ncial institutions solvent than 
to look after the general welfare of the peoplee 
The election had been delayed long enough for economic 
recovery to be quite apparent; it was found possible in August, 
1935;to restore cuts in civil servants' wages, in widows' and 
war veterans' pensions. Yet for every person who might feel 
1. Figures taken f:r>om graph p.153 of' 11 0ontemporary New Zealand 11• 
by N. z. I. I. A. 
grateful, there were me.ny to echo the Labour politicians' claim 
that recovery was in spite of' the present Government,· not be~ 
cause of ito No relief came for the family-man wage-earner 
who found it very difficult on reduced income to meet the in-. 
creased demand of indirect taxes. Even acknowledging the un-
precedented severity of the depression, and the excusable in-
adequacy of the men who had to grapple with it, many people were 
convinced that more should have been done to reduce the poverty 
in the midst of plentye It was this spirit that Condliffe 
interpreted when in 1930 he commented that, 11 If New Zealanders 
can be se.id to have any social or economic theories, pride of 
place must undoubtedly be given to the general theory that human 
consider•ationi; should take precedence of economic progress, or 
perhaps that true economic progress can in the long run be based 
only upon human welfare". 1 • 
1. J. B. Condliffe, 0 New Zealand in the Maldng", Po 361-t ... 
10. 
THE PARTIES; THEIR ORGANISATION AND E_INANCE. 
The Ne.tional Coalition did not expect to maintain them-
selves as the Government without a life-and-death struggle. 
In addition to the unfailing opposition from the Labour Party: 
there was no lack of evidence of a changed political atmosphere 
in the country even before the Democrat Party was conjured up 
by a political geniee 
In 1930, Sir Francis Bell had predicted1a Labour Victory 
when a drop in farm prices should i~educe farmers to a 0 hopeless 11 
state. If this did not happen in 1931, it was only because 
farmers did. not yet have any more to hope f'or fr•om Labour than 
from Reform •. Their despondency found expression, nevertheless, 
in an unusual nun1ber o:r votes for Independent candidates in i--ural · 
districts. Next they turned towarcls the Social Credit monetary 
reformers, who were actively working through the Auckland branch-
es of the Farmers'. Unions These d.:i sciples of' Major Douglas set 
out to educate the people in the elementary pr•inciples of curren-, 
cy and banking. It was their insistence that forced the Gov-
er:nment to set up a Parliamentary Cornmi ttee to exa111ine and report 
upon the Dominion's monetary system. The two reports (a ·major-
ity and minority one) were widely read. 2• 
1 e In a letter to Downie Stewart, quoted by Lipson in °The 
Politics of Equality", po228. 
2e 11 No State paper in New Zealand ever had a more successful 
circulationtt. Beaglehole, "New Zealand't 1 Pe 114. 
For Reports see Appendix to P. De, 1934=5, B. 3. 
1 t. 
It was not only the farnie1 .. s who gave active expression 
to their i .. esentment; 11 pu1Jlic servants were producing schemes 
of finances alternative to wage~1 .. eduction".. 1 • Community' cells 
were enlarging, swollen with bitter unemployed peoplee 1933 
'i'v'8.S the year of the Legion's f'ir•st appearance: a movement with 
va,r,;1:1E hopes that a better type of candidate might be found, but 
itself pref'erring not to be embroiled in the unpleasantness of 
politics. "It undoubtedly attracted the support of many young 
men, of the professional classes, for example ••• o tt 2• It was 
an organisation of 11 the extreme Righttt according to the Socialist 
"Tomorrow" e 3. Since j_ t disclaimed any connection with poli t-
ical partiesll it cannot. be said to have contributed to the rise 
of the Labour Party; no\.:' the fate of the Coalition, but it seems 
likely that followers of the Legion were a protest group against 
the Government and would be attracted to the many Independents 
rather than to any party since they had denounced sectional 
interests, professing to be "simply one. big organisation for the 
cominon good. 11 
There were numerous more vociferous critics ranging from 
"pink papersn to political pamphleteers but one most effective 
protest ce_me from a group of Church dignitaries., There had been 
many complaints by clergyraen of the desperate state of the poorer 
families and especi~_lly of the malnutrition suffered by childr•en, 
which had not been alleviated even in the fourth year of depress-
ione Some Auckland clergymen organised a mass meeting ttat which 
ibid., p .. 103 .. 
Morrell: 11New Zealand", p .. 231 e 
11 Tomorrow", July 31st,. 1935.. It was noted that the Legim~' s 
journal had the short life of only a :fortnight in 1934e 
Morrell: 11 New Zealand", p. 231 • 
Archbishop Averill, the Primate of' the Anglican church in New 
Zealand~ put to the audience a resolution. calling upon the 
N t i 1 ,..., t t . ti 1 • 1a ona_ ~overnmen o resign • So the Coalition had come 
within a few months of the election e.nd was still unable to show 
sufficiently effective progress to win back some of' its most 
important former supporters. 
Such protests, nevertheless, did not constitute opposit-
ion. That had to come from organised groups able to blend the 
varied complaints into firm resistancee Of the political organ-
is~tions contesting the 1935 election, only three were large 
enough to be called parties ~ National, I.abour and Democratse 
Often the lesser candidates were praised for thei1 .. personal qual-
i ties but rejected for la.ck of adequate backing. An Auckland 
observer 2• considered that H. M. Rushworth was preferred in the 
Bay of' Islands for his personal qualifications rather than for 
his Country Party affiliations, but even the latter were accept-
able since for election purposes tl1e Country Party "is an ally of 
Labour"e 3. But of F. We Doidge it was said that; with his dis-
tinctive personality and ability proven abroad (as a journalist), 
he 11 would have had excellent prospects of election had he allied 
himself with a major party". 4. 
1 • R. F. Paddock in an article in 11Poli ti cal Quarterly", Apri 1, 
1936, p. 260. This resolution was discussed in the House: se~ 
P.D. Vol. 242, Pe363~ and more evidence offerea_ by Howard (Lab.) 
Pv 376, that many Christchur•ch school children had no shoes 
to wear and were under=nourishede 
2. "Auckland Star11 , November 22nd, 1935. 
3. i"bide This definition could not have been accepted by the Lab-
our Partye Labour candidates opposed the Country Party in 
Tauranga and Waikato, successfully~ Probably it was Rush-




Without either of these aids= impressive personal 
qualities and strong party backing?' the minor groups had little 
place in the struggle.. Only the Democrat Party seemed ·r~o have 
any chance of challenging the Nationalists or Labour, and was 
~qually reviled by both. 
1~ NATIONAL PARTY: 
The Coalition was being considered as one party even 
before its amal.gamation as the National Political Federation was 
announced. They differed very little in policy but by their• ri~ 
valry brought govePnment to a dangerous state of pi:u•alysis )with 
Labour advancea to the key position of holding the balance between 
them .. The depression macle it im:perati ve to put an end to pol-
itical stalemate, but it also made it impossible for either party 
to retain any indi viduali tye Neither could be absolved from 
the share it had had in measures to restore economic balance. 
When the adjective ttreactionary0 was thrown it stuck to Liberals 
as well as Reformers, just as the term 11 socialists" was equally 
mis-applied to both., They could not return to the former 
divisions but made no move to resolve the topsy-turvy situation 
in which the leaders found themselvese 
Forbes, who stood to increase the Liberals' popularity 
by removing them from the connection with Coate:;;;,could not stand 
alone~ His abilities were admitted by all to be mediocre, 
though he was personally more popular than Coate.s. 
Minister, moreover, could not hope to win the confidence of the 
country if he presented himself as a potential Prime Minister. 
He he.d alI'eacly outwoPn his welcome with most of the voters of 
1931, but could scarcely be rejected if Forbes continued to 
work with himo 
May, 1935· 
This unmitisf'actory state was brought to an end in 
1 .. They reached an understanding and announced 
a new organisation - the National Politice.l Federation, theil" 
candidates to be known as Natione.list.s. There were only six 
months left in which to regain :for the Nationalists the support 
that the Coalition had lost. It was decided to employ cler~ 
ical staff' and build up the non=parliamentary side of theil" 
organisation but 1•11ttle was done in that direction". 20 
Because both pa1.,ties had disbanded their respective 
o~ganisations when they cornbined in 1931, the new oragar1-isers 
WePe hampered by a lack of a central office and workerse 
Though they felt handicapped, they were apparently too active 
for the Democrat leader's peace of mind. T.C.A. Hislop com-
plained 3 · that he was being followed by satellites o.f the 
Government sent to report to their mastei-•s on the advance of the 
Democrat Party .. He referred also to the Coe.lition members' 
having to act as tnei r own organj_ sers in the preceed.ing months 
and stated thnt e. rnember of the IJegislative Council, the Bono 
F. Waite~ was an organiser too@ 
1. In Dorn.inion newspapers on May 13th, 19350 
2.. See bulletin WPitten for the 1946 election, reviewing 
National party history. According to the ttNew Zealand 
Herald", October 17th, 1935, a. nucleus of' a Dominion 
Executive was fo1'rned at the Party Conference, then just 
concluded,. snd provincial organisations were le:f.'t to 
add others. 
3. "New Zealand Herald11 , September 21st, 1935 .. 
The complete absence of contact with the electo1•ate 
through voluntary workers made the National candidates'work diffi-
cult in comparison with the steady work carried on in constit-
uencies by Labour Volunteerse 1• An additional handicap was 
the inability to announce any sort of policy to counteract the 
effect of persistent campaigning about guaranteed prices and in-
creased State services. Apart from a few secessions - notably 
W .. Downie Stews.rt' s - the survivors of the Reform and Liberal 
parties had been welded by the heat of' a.epr>ession battles into a 
solidly anti=Labour corps, resentful of' Labour's refusal to join 
a National Government.o A union had been achieved ·to fight the 
better against Labour, but the National Political Federation was 
not the real National Partyo This was not formed until· 1936, 
when there was a con:ference of the Nationalists and all those of 
. 2. 
other parties opposed to So.c1alism .. 
Unfortunately for the Nationalists, though they knew 
positively what they were opposed to, they had not done much clear 
thinking about what they proposed. to doo 
programme was their most· severe drawbacke 
Lack of' a dynamic 
Throughout the de= 
pression and at the election; and afterwards it proved very dif-
ficult to go one better than Labour .. 
1o Probably this also was in Forbes's mind when he complained 
the day before Parliament was dissolved that while ttwe are 
wastihg time talking to one another, the Democrats are 
talking to our voters 11 e "Nf:lw Zealand Herald 11 , October 
5th, 1935e 
2. 11 P:r'ess", June 16, 1936,and,according to a bulletin issued 
by t.he Head Office of the National Party reviewing the 
political situation, 1935-1946~ 
THE LABOUR PARTY: 
The Labour Party might well have come to power in New 
Zea land within a decade of 1935 1 even if' there had been no de-
pression to hasten the change-overe From its inception in 1916 
as a contestant for Parliamentary seats, Labour candidates made 
steE?-d.Y progress in captur•ing city electorates while several vet -
erans held rural seatse If the Reform and Uni tea. groups had 
continued to oppose one another, the weight of urban numbers lean-
ing towards Labour might soon have tipped the balance in their 
favouro Further, had the conservative party remained in power 
in 1935, it is conceivable that there might have been a swing 
towards Labour for no better re~.son than that of boredom with 
f'amiliar faces and a desire to see what the other side could do. 
However, the Labour victory was more than a r•eflection 
of the Nationalists' defeat. By 1935 it was the most effective 
political organisation in the countrye In its constant activ-
ities in the electorates it showed some of the characteristics 
of a British political party, not because of the need to prepare 
against a sudden dissolution, but because, with.out constant coll-
ections from socials, dances, card evenings or jumble sales)) they 
could not be ready to fight the General Election every three 
years. 
Party organisation was then very similar to the present 
system except that there wer•e fewer Labour Party Branches, with 
fewer members and fewer tdnions affiliated, -;v;Ji th smaller union 
membership. 1 • 
1. This infor·mation, and that following concerni~g organisation, 
was told to the writer by Mr. G. Dell, member of the Christ= 
chu1"ch South Branch of the Labour Party in 19.P:-5~ and since. 
The structure dates back to 1919& Several branches would be 
grouped under one Labour Representation Committee, which managed 
the Labour contests for municipal elections and assisted finan-
cially with General Elections~ if they had money to spare" 
There were no paid organisers f'or either Representation Committ-
ees or Branches$ The Labour' Party was built up on the enthus~ 
iasm of the voluntary workers in each electoratee Before elect-
ions, each branch member willing to assist was made responsible 
for a portion of an electorate, calling at homes to ensure that 
electors were on the roll, delivering literature and organising 
collections of moneye In Whangarei the fir·st contributions for 
election year came from the annual Labour Party picnic which was 
described 1• as a great success - presumably from a financial 
point of' view. 
Preparations had been going on from 1934 for the main 
electoral eff'ort. Plans were made for tours of the constit-
uencies during February~ 1935> by the party leader. Until the 
depression showed that it might be possible to catch discontented 
farmers on the rebound, Labour energies had been concentrated. on 
urban areas .. The work of capturing rural electorates, often 
without branches or with ones still barely established, had to 
be done from the cities generally. Members of Parliament or 
prominent Labour Party members would address meetings and arrange 
for advertising and distribution of' pamphlets .. For months 
prior to the election all Labour members of' Parliament were 
actively expounding the party line throughout New Zealand in their 
1 o Lsbou1"' Party's Annual Conference Report, 1936 o 
weekend excursions away from Wellington. This early start, to-
gether with "the enthusiasm with which all candidates entered 
the contestn 1. was consider·ed to have had a large part in deter= 
mining the favourable results in many newly=won electoratese 
Und.erlying it all were the united efforts~ spreaa. over many years, 
of the industrial and political organisations which constituted 
the Labour movemente Unlike the rusty political organisation 
of the National Party, the Labour machine was in excellent con-
dition s.nd had only to be accelerated without the delay of' chang-
ing gears that hindered their opponent Se 
THE DEMOCRAT PARTY: 
In .New Zealand, the Democrat Party did not stand in re-
lation to the main parties as the Liberals have done in England 
in recent years. There the Liberals have hung on to their 
sme.11 representation and maintained some prominent men in Parlia-
ment with an unspectacular middle-way policy. The Democrats 
here were given all the courtesies due to a major third party 
by the Press, the opposing politicians, and the Broadcasting 
Corporation but they could not boast of a long historye They 
were a mushroom growth with a life of a little r11ore than a yeare 
Though they found fifty=three candidates for the election, only 
four had had previous Parliamentary· experience. 
The defects that most prejudiced their chances of elect-
ion were the sudden onslaugh:t they made on politics a.nd the sur-
prise nature of their policy. It would have been better to have 
1a ibido 
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worked up gradually from small beginnings, with a few well-
established membe1~s paving the way f'or a more generous represent-
ation later. The policy was a matter of some difficulty; no 
middle-way programme was suitable; half measures could never 
satisfy in face of the Labour programme, so this difficult sit= 
uation was not 1 .. esolved until September, the third month bef'ox>e 
the elections and a year since the new party's inception .. 
The long silence was not due-. to inactivity on the part 
of the Democrat organiser. This was A. E. Davy, who was a.s 
much a target for vilification by the Democrats' opponents as was 
the leader, Hislop~ In announcing the new party in 1934, the 
":&iven:tng Posto 1 • recalled that Davy he.d been the organiser for 
the Reform party at the last election and quoted him as saying 
that his quarrel was not with the persons· of the Government but 
with thei:i:- economic advisers whose tt socie.li sm11 had evoked his 
resignation. Even earlier he had been responsible for the 
successful campaign which had retrieved the :fortune of the Liber= 
als under a new name ttuni tedtt., This readiness of Davy to put 
himself at the service of rival parties like a mercenary soldier 
of pre-Napoleonic days earned for him a certain notorietye 
The origin and development o:f the Democrat Party was 
likened to machine politics of the United States of Americae 2" 
C. R. Petrie, the Le.bour candidate for• Hauraki ~ expressed surprise 
that a distinguishing mark of a Davy campaign, the slogan, was 
missing- He suggested llNew Foes with Old Faces~~ 3. 
1e- September 29th, 1934. 
2. Davy mentioned in conversation with the writer that he got 
his propaganda ideas :from Americae 
3 e Quoted by 0 New Zealand Herald 11 , November 1st, 1935. 
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Such censures came from all sidese It was common opinion that 
the party was the expression of the dissatisfaction of certain 
wealthy men >Nho resented the increased taxation of' depression 
economy. One such critic, Sir· Alexander Herdman, had himself 
been included in the earliest negotiations~ but had wi thd1·awn 
as the clash of' rival interests within the party created new 
difficulties .. Though Davy had been active through the Dominion1 
engaging organisers and opening offices, because of differences 
of opinion with his Auckland employers he was not able to announoe 
a lead.ex• until August, 19350 Tl(.is deficiency had been noted 
by the 11Mercantile Gazette 11 : "In our opinion and in absence of 
any publicity as to the party and its progranme, the Democrats 
will not effect the real cont est u 1 .. 
If the mainspring of the party till then had been Davy, 
the oPiginator was We Goodfellow, prominent in the New Zealand 
.Co-operative Dsiry Company and in the Auckland. Farme1"s' Union, 
who planned to secure a small party of elected members, 11 suffic-
ient to hold the balance of power in the House11 2" Instead of 
ten or twelve menll Davy found fifty":"three .. Tha.t he exceeded 
"7. 
his instructions is revealed by subsequent Press :not ices :.> • of 
court proceedings when Goodfellow attempted to caincel the five-
year term of engagement with Davy and to reclaim f'r·om hi.m 
1. Aug .. 1st, 1935, p .. 921 Q The "Mercantile Gazettett i was an 
unwavering supporter of the Goverimnente ' 
2e J. Oaughley in a lette1•, 12-6-48, to the writero Caughley, 
De...mocx•at candidate for Kaipe.ra., was once Direotor of 
Education in New Zealande 
3e "New Zealand Heraldu~ Octobel"' 19th, 19350 
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£ 1145 16 8 paid as salary. The fault may not have been all on 
Davy's sidee A Democrat candidate 1 • gave a hint about the 
reason for Goodfellow's withdrawal when he asserted that Uno 
honest party could consider making the concessions that power·ful 
vested inte1"ests demanded in retux•n for their support". 
The withdrawal of Good:f'ellow before the par.ty con:ference 
on .August 21st followea_ on· the rejection of' Doidge, his nominee 
for the party's presidency. Auckland supporters of Sir Alex-
ander Herdman were also defeated and he-too went his Independent 
way., Although there were three men at the conference with 
Parliamentary experience and two of these were ex=Ministers (A.Jo 
Stallworthy and .J.B. Donald) ·it was Davy's candidate, T.C.A. 
Hislop 1 Mayor of' Wellington_l but unknmrvn. in national politics~ 
who was elected party leaders 
Throughout this sparring pePiod, provincial organi sEn•s 
had been at work setting up corrnnittees which found candidates 
and agentse Collecting funds ws.s not their province; 2 " it 
was handled by the central organisers. In ~ach electorate 
canvassers were selected to approach electors, to discuss issues 
and make reportse Some of these workers were paid, but most 
were volunteers. They could have been of little help to the 
candidates until the policy announcement of October 1'st gave them 
something to discuss with electors. 
The Democrats were at a disadvantage ·1:rn the' Labour and 
National Parties' policies were already familial"' to the public in 
1. H. T. Thornley (Manu.kau) quoted in "N. Z.Ho 11 , November~ 6th', 1935 
2. This. information came f'rom Davy, in conversation with· the 
writer, September 1st, 19480 
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essence, if not in detail. While they hovered in indecision, 
the nation was making up its mind that the issue lay between 
Labour and Nationalists. The press encouraged this view, so 
that the Democrat intex•vention became an "Aunt Sally" with enter-
taJ.runent value only, while the heaviest ammunition was reserved 
for the more sex•ious targets. Despite their many handicaps no 
one in the Democrats was prepair1:id for total failure .. Not even 
the leader4 nol( the deputy-leade:t-., W.A. Vei tch.11 gained a seat. 
Many of them/ lost :financially, too, having to :forfeit the £10 
" . t 1. . 
uepos1 • 
Although the Nationalist, Labour and Democrat candidates 
account for only 200 of the 265 candidates, the small groupings 
were generally ignored by the press and given scant e.tt ention by 
their o~ponents. Their insignificance gave l"'ise to claims of 
affiliation with one of the larger parties, sometimes officially 
or through some mis-informed supporter or commentator. 
It may have been true as wa.-s. 2 ~ claimed that there 
were many inarticulate Liberals th1•oughout the country, though 
the results· justified the remark in the p1 ... ess correspondence 
columns 3• that.11 Liberalism being quite dead, it was useless to 
support McLachlan (Nat.Lib~) or any other Liberal candidate. 
There was a party with five candidates to expound a platform 
1. 32 of the 56 Democrats lost their deposits, i.e. 57%, the 
same proportion as the Independents who suffered. 
2. Quoted by a correspondent in 11Press", November 20th, 1935. 
3. "Press", November 25th. 
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avoiding the "opposite extremes of Reform and Labour" 10 In 
Au.ckla.nd their name was linked with the Nationalists but in 
Christchurch, where no Liberal candidates could be found, the 
branch exp1"essecl agr·eement 2 • with the Democrats whom they had 
decided to supporto Yet there was no agreement elsewhere be-
tween Liberals and Democratsl1 who both put up candidates in the 
We.itemata, Roskill, Wanga.nui and Invercargill electorates. 
Nevertheless, the Democrats found it useful to acknowJ.edge the 
connection, even though it was with such an obscure section of 
a.dying party. 
It was not in the interests of' the Labour party to have 
theiP name linked with another minor group, as the Communists 
tried_ to persuade them to do. The matter was brought up at 
the Easter Conference of the LBbour Party and, receiving no reply 
to their letter) the Communist Party, ap:proachi,fl:J~· them in August, 
again by letter, 3·only to be rebuffed for their past antagonism 
to the La.bour Party and its policye Cons1de:ring the unpopula:P-
i ty of Oorm-riuni sm with the me. jori ty of' the vi ta.I electors - that 
is, the farmers and the middle-class city people - the Labou1" 
Party did well to avoid any Pecrudescernrn of the "Red Fed" labels 
Memories of the militant unionism of 1913 were best avoided, as 
were any connections with the party that was blamed for inciting 
1 e lfNew Zealand Heraldtt, September 30th. 
2. t!Press", Oct ob er· 12th, 19 35. 
3. The letter and the ensuing corpespondence were reprinted in 
the "Workers' Weekly", August 2L~th, 1935. The Communist 
proposal was f'ox• the two parties to :form a joint organ-· 
isation and progr•amme, the Comnmnist Par·ty of:f'ering to 
withdraw its ce.ndidates in constituencies where Labour 
was standings 
1. 
the unemployed men to riot in Auckland in April, 1932e More-
over, as the main support of the Communist· Par•ty came from the 
unemployed wo1"kers' union, there could be no financial gain for 
La.bour funds by any temporary unione 
Both the Labour and the Cornrnuni st parties found. the ex-
pense of the election a great strain on rather meagre resourcese 
It was fortunate for all parties concerned that there hs.d been 
so few by-electionse Although an extra yea1 .. had been added to 
the li:fe of the twenty-fourth Par>liament, there had been only 
five by-elections in four• years 2 e Not even the National party 
with its more well-to=do supporte1"s ·'could have found it easy to 
finance an election after years of low Pl"ices s.nd slow recoveryo 
It is not easy to make comparisons between the financial. 
situation of one party and another. The subject is not one 
that political censors would epprove for universal exhibition~ 
There is usually reluctance to refer to it, unless to discredit 
the opposition 1 s arr·angement s. In ordinary circwnstances such 
use might be a two-edged weapon, inviting retaliatory disclosures. 
It so hsppened in 1935 that the Labour party was making a. featur·e 
of its financial situation as a way of gaining sympathy for the 
Cinde,rella of politic so 
Davy did not touch the "small stuff" as he called the 
penn~;--a-week contributions to the Labour Party funds, but canvassed 
1. Also riots in Dunedin, April 8th and Wellington, May 10th. 
See "Press", .April 9th and May 12th, 19320 
2. Year Book, 1936~ Po692. 
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the big firms, starting with those likely to give thousands 
of pounds and working down to £100. If' this was an accurate 
account of Democrat methods it would also be so for the .National-
ists, whose supporters were in the same economic class. 
Another possible source of income is mentioned by Stall-
1 • 
worthy, a·n ex-Mini st er of the United Government 1 when he alleged. 
that a Legislative Councillor was given Ministerial rank partly 
because he had 11 collected .considerable party funds". Whether 
this explanation of' the appointment of' an unpopular colleague 
is reliable or not, it suggests <:t likely method of adding to pol-
itical fund.so An influential man would be welcome in any 
party. 
Almost invaPiably the members of ·Parlis.ment had to have 
anotheP source of income besides their salary of f36LJ. 10 0) 
which sca1"cely covered living costs$ travelling and electoral ex-
pensese Absence from home was e.n ob:stacle to successful busi-
ness or professional careers. This difficulty accoU:nts for the 
predominance of' the farmer$ in the National Party and of' t.he union 
secretary in the Labour Party. In their own electorates, can-
didates kept down expense by holding stPeet-corner meetingsi 
while their organisers and agents were trying in numerous ways to 
get contri bu ti ons from the l)Ublic .. 
Perhaps because they were having such a struggle to get 
funds, having to take up collections at m.eetings ancl be content 
with modest demands, Labour candida.tes ma.de much of Fe Lan.gstone • s 
1o In a letter to the writer, 24-7-48e 
1 • 
attack on the Reform PartJr by reading at an electore.l meeting 
a copy of e. cj_rculal"' address.ad to farmers in December 1933 .. 
It ux•ged f'armer·s to help place the par·ty finances in a. sound. con-
dition, ren1inding them that the Labour Pax>ty, which was extra~ 
ordinarily well organised, made a levy on its supporters .. After 
reference to the 25% exchange benef'it obtained fop them at the 
Refopm Party's insistence, the letter concluded: "Are you going 
to let them (~he Labour Part;y;1 occupy Government benches and im= 
pose 1egislation which may sooi1 ruin you, simply because you re= 
:flitsed to support you:r. own party?" Attached to the letter was 
a form on whtch farmers could pledge themselves to a donation 
equal to 1% of wool and stock sales for the current season. 
There is no difference in px•inciple between this appeal 
j , 
and the Labour Party's collections through T1-.ade .t)nions, except 
that in the Coalition's case it was an account for services l"'end= 
ereda The Labour candidates chose, however, to take up atttt-
udes of righteous indignations They complained in ci.rcular 
letters 2" that whereas their own supporters were not wealthy,. 
"money was being poured out like watertt by the P1"'ess, the large 
landownex•s and the banks to help their opponentse Their own 
contributions came from local party branches, 3. from Represent-
ation Cormnittees' memb$rship fees and capitation dues and indiv-
idual sums. This money was all received by the Hes.d Office and 
1. 0 mvening Post 0 July 4th, 1935. Davy hailed this disclosure 
as "embarrassing 11 in retailing it in the Democrat "Hand-
book" :for the benef'i t of candidates .. 
2o See copy in Appendix. C.II. 
3. These were acknowledged weekly in ''Stand1:.~.rc1 II e For a typ= 
ical extract see Appendix C.III. 
held in trust for pe.rticular electorates .. 
An appeal had been m8.de early in 1935f for £5000 for a 
National Campaign Fund. By the end of N overnb er i. t was not 
fully· subscribed, so Yvas not closed until April of the following 
year. There was another fund for nationAl publicity and ad= 
vertising, for which £700 was obtained, but over £1000 was spent 
on newspaper advex•tisements, theatre slides, m8gazine ad.vertise-
1 • ( ments and pamphlets The pamphlet on gu,8.X'a:nteed pPices to 
be sent to every farmer in the district) was offered 2 • free of 
charge to candidG.tes on condition that the cost of householder• 
postage be refunded to the National HeadquartersQ 
In s.pi te to the Lsbour Party's of'fice records being in= 
complete owing to tl1.e pressure of work at the time of the campeigr. 
there is einple evidence of the care:ful planning and 8.ttention to 
detEd.l that characterized the party's determined courting of 
electorates. Lack of I'esources e.nd author± ta ti ve position were 
offset by enthusiasm end skilful appeal to the voter. Lack 
of money was capitalized as a virtue = Labour was a Cinderella 
sharing the people's poverty. 
No other party was so well placed for the struggle. 
The Nation.al Par•ty had experience• but could not point to inspired 
achievements and was not well prepared ~or a defensive war. 
1., Annual Financial Report and Ba.lance Sheet of the Labour Party 
1936. Comparisons were me.de with expenditure of other 
years: in 1931-1. £48 was spent on postage whereas in 1935 
the cost of postage was £2260 
2a In a circu.18.r letter dated 18-11-35, s,en at the Labour 
Party's Head Office, Wellingtono 
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The Democrats had energetic leadership but their strength was 
dissipated. The early quarrels had made them all somewhat 
suspect of jockeying for position. It was damning to have three 
candidates and the originator of the party retire after disagree-
ments. The remaining candidates had to start from scratch in 
most cases and were delayed by lack of' def'ini te instructions un-
til the policy was hammered out by their leaders. Members of 
the lesser groups and .Independents had each to prove his own 
worth with no external aids. Natiomil and Labour candidates 
might quite well be returned by the place of the party as a whole 
in the esteem of the voter, whereas the Independent and other 
minor groups had little more to offer than personality and in-
dividual worth. It was possib::J.e for the party to carry passeng-
ers but the lesser contestants had to fight on their own merits 
and often deserved, as men, rewards that went to parties. 
29. 
THE OAN:O IDA TES. 
Members of the retiring Parliament had not been a 
characteristic section of the people they represented. The 
predominance of farmer members in this Parliament might have 
been suitable in view of the supPemacy of primary produce in the 
national wealth but it was not a proper representation of' 
national interests. The f'arming ;ascendancy had been arti-
ficially created by a constitutional device, the country quota1• 
- at the expense of urban electorates. If the Coalition memb-
ers had been evenly dj.stributed between urban and rural elector-
at es, it would have been less important that m;:o_ny of them were 
:farmers, but since they held only eight of the thirty-two urban 
seats, it was the compla.int of the town-dweller that his inter-
ests had been subordinated to those of the f'armer. An addi t-
ional injustice resulted from the lag between census disclosures 
and elect oral boundai->y re-adjustments. Between the 1927 
Electoi->al Act and the 1935 election¥ no allowance could be made 
for the considei->a.ble urbanisation which had taken place. 2 • 
Criticisms of this situation were raised mainly by 
Laboui-> suppor•ters s.nd were actuated b;>r party jealousy, hot by 
1. In rural areas five miles outside the chief post offices 
of the four mAin cities of' New Zealand every 100 elect-
ors was reckoned at 128, making a 28% increase1iin their representation. See Year Book, 1945, p. 11. In 1935 
the ef'fect was to give rural electors four additional 
represent8tives according to Hon. W. Mcintyre; see P.D. 
Vol. 242, p. 335. See s lso Lipson_, "Poli tics of Eq_ual-
i ty", PlJl• 174-185 for C' full discussion of the eff'ect 
of' the country guotD on representation. 
2. See Year Book. p. 23 and. Lipson, op.cit. J p. 178. 
a dislike of the :farmer as a ParJ.i0mentary representative. 
Indeed, rnan;sr o-r the urbB.n elector>s have close connection vd.tb. 
rm:--al lif'e e.nd sre not oblivious to farmers' needs& Their com~ 
plaints were seldom directed ngrdnst persons. There is little 
evidence that New Zealand electiom are merred by f;.busi ve person-
al attacks on politicians, such as have to be enduped in.,,United 
J ~ 
This is partly due to the superio1" c:;ue.li ty of the 
me. jori ty of newspaper repo1-.ting s.nd cormnente. from which comes 
most of the in:f'ormat.ion s•bout cnnclidstes. Since J\Tevr Zealand-
ers have received most of their cormnentaries on politics from 
the da.ily newspaper, the influence of such a gossipy little 
journal ~s the "Critic'' 1• would have had a negligible effect 
upon electors. 
\fuen one considers the candidates in this 1935 elect-
ion as :::. whole, the f'ir·st signific&.nt fact to emerge is thet 
there were en unusually large numbeJ: of them. 
NUMBER OF CANDifo~ TFiS: TABLE ·J. 
. ' ----~~---~-.. ~~- .... ·--"···-·--·"·-· .. --- ..................... --,-· ·--"·""·, .. -.... . ... ·---.. ·--, .---·--.. ---~--.--~--·"~""'"·-··--.... ., 
\ 1925 1928 1931 1935 1938 -=--~~~~~1 ....... _ .. ,.,. ..... -~-~~~"'"'"'='~==~~- .... ··- -~---""'-·._j,..,-......... =-........ ·~·----~ .............. ~ 
Whites I 190 193 189 246 160 
Meiiris 1- 2:~ 2::----- 2:~~~--2~·······-··1-~~--
J --------------· -- -------------. -----·---.l. -~~--~-·-·-·--- - -·- ·- - ------------
Only in 1943 was there greater competition, when 268 
2. 
candidates appeared. The desperate conditions of depression 
years nmst hs.ve encouraged me.ny to think thc.t they eould do 
1.. Published weekly in Wellington between 10-7-34 and 6=2·~36o 
2. Lipson, op. cit., P~235. 
31. 
better· than the .Government in managing the ~ountry' s affairs. 
Closely-contested elections not only hf1ve a multiplicity of 
candidates but also have no uncontested seats. Part of the 
explanation for the smaller munber of contestants at the three 
previous elections lay in the existence of several uncontested 
seats on each occasion. In 1931, there were four. In 1935 
there was a surfeit of candidates in some electorates, making 
for confusion in the minds of electors. 
Some retiring members had an embarrassing galaxy of 
five or six opponents for their seat. In Wellington East 
there were six candidates - one each :for the Nationalr Labour, 
Democrat and Communist Parties a.nd two Independents. It was 
Northe1'n Maori which led vdth seven contestants - a NstionRlist, 
a Ratana, a Democrat and four Indepern:lents. It was explained 1. 
that this is not uncommon; Maoris appear at elections as un-
officia.l cBndidetes for various parties, never having been heard 
of before by the membe1's of the party concerned, and after de-
feat are not hesrd of again in politics. Their enthusiasm 
for debate is not matched by iIMu:·sistence in the politicHl field. 
TABLE 2 •. NUMBER OF CANDIDA TES PER SEAT. 
Electorates: 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total SeatE 
White 15 35 20 5 1 76 
Maori 1 1 1 
"' 4 I 
_filL_ 
- . ··-·-··-·-·-------------· 
1. By the National Secretary of the New Zealand Lebour Party 
in e.n interview with the writer. 
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Of the 80 elector>ateG only 15 h8d e simple cont est 
betvveE:Jn two cs.ndidetes. In most of the others there were 
close cont est s bet wec:;n three and four cs.ndid.c1 t es. This is 
not unusu81 as reference to TAble 1 shows. Though Maori 
seats genere.lly lwve :fo1i1~ ce.ndiO.t:~tes offer<ir1g, the pv.keha con·~ 
te;:~ts are only between two on the 2ver•age in the normsl yeersa 
One indication of the unusual Lo.te1~est apoused in this 
election is the gre;:~t numberi of Indepenc1ents presenting them-
I 
selves. Lack of :Pa:r•ty backing should det e:r even the rr1ost en-
pendents v<.re.Pe many who hea_ not contested e.n election before. 
In previouB yeB-rs their numbers had var:i. ed. from 16 in 1925 to 
25 in 1931. To account for the grest inc:rense in Inde1)end~ 
ents one ollser·vep 1 • advsnc:er.i the explenation ths1t. 11 sele:etion 
of weak officisl er.nclidntes brinc:s into the field many Inde-
pendent s 11 • 
Wtth only 37 of' the r-Ert.iring member·s of the Nf>tional 
party standing 2. ge in for election~ almost half the cBndicla tes 
wePe polt tice.lly inexperienceiJ. but they were not necessarily 
weak and the cal"lbl'.'e of the National e2.ndide:tes does not eppear' 
to hsve influenced the decisionr:; o:f many Ine.eriendents to pres~ 
ent the:msel ves for• electl on. Twenty=one of th0m pitted their• 
Bt:r.'ength against I.e.bour and Nations 1. esnrlidates who won 7 in 
most cases with sHfe majorities. 1JD.even more Independents 
opposed men who received a large share in voting totals but 
1. EcUto:ri<?l comment in the '1P:ress 11 , Chr·istchu1~ch, Me;'f 13th., 
33. 
because of the split votes, were not returned. It seems 
likely that the calibre of the individual cs.ndidate in this 
election was of less importance then the attractiveness of the 
policy he suppoPted. 
N2,t. Lab.Dem. Ind. Lib. J:fat-Li b. Ind~ Lab. Com. 8oce C. P. Ratana TO TAI 
White . 70 70 53 36 5 1 3 3 3 3 246 
Maori 4 2 3 6 2 2 19 
-'-- :~:=: ~~ ~ 74 72 56 l~.2 5 1 5 3 3 
Naturally the orgGnisea. parties EWcounted for the great-
/ 
est part of' the 265 candid2.t es. Apart from a few of the large 
bloc of Independents and two each f1,om the R2.ta1w. t=ond Country 
Parties, the dwindling tail of Communists, Socialists, Liberals 
and unofficial National and Labour ce.ndidates affected the fo1":i;-
unes of the main parties very little@ Among these were the 
candidates who received the lowest 'hmnbers of vote·s,; 
(Ind.) 28? was the lowest and the next were s Socialist, a 
Communist and a Maori unofficial Democrat$ Surprisingly enough, 
they did not all lose their deposits by failing to poll one 
quarte1" of the votes for the successful candidate, although one 
Nationalist did. 
]'A~rI ON.AL CAIID IDA TES i 
When the writs were . closed on November 12th and nomin-
ations ceased, there wel"e six seats without National candid.ates~ 
These were not contested either because of the strength of the 
opposing Labour candidates or, in the cases of Thsmes and Well..; 
:E!ORBES 
ington Suburbs, because the Independents who held the seats 
were anti=Labour men whose chances would be endangered if' a 
Nationalist intervened and whp had generally supported the Go= 
ali ti on. Elsewhere the Nation0lists mustered up what streggth 
they could but were hs.ndicapped by hsving so many newcomers 
standing in the p18.ces vacated by older men. Sir· Charles 
Statham, the Speaker, had retir•ed; so had W.H.Field of Otald, 
who at seventy yea rs of' age had 33 years of service 1)ehind him .. 
The party was f'urther handicapped by the 1:-§:Pprobrium 
that was a-t;tached to the nar11es of those who had been in office 
in the preceding four year>s. It coloured the l)Ublic' s a:i:tti t-
ude towards the innocent new.entrants. Even those who had 
supported the Coa li ti on were not uncri tico.1. The resignat= 
ion of Stewart from the Cabinet and the independent attitude 
ts.ken up by Stallworthy, Veitch and Samuel only confirmed the 
public's sur.;picions that the party leE1.ders were not men :bf vis-
ion and were inadequate for the positions they held. 
It was unfortu.nate for the astute Coates that he haiJ. 
to share the leadership with the less capable but more popular 
Forbes. I!1orbes' s qualities were closer to those of the common 
nmn and together they must have resented Goates' s mental energy, 
which ·he.d such unpalatable repereussions in fhJ.encir.:il wizardrye 
Th 1 1 th b tt "" h · t · 1 e Forb,, .... "'" - a hi· ""hJ y oug:l 116 was . e u 0.L rm.:tc Jes .. ing, es vvo.8 ' (:, . 
respected veteren and tribute was made to his sterling quslities 
1. Beaglehole in "New Zealand", Po89, says of Forbes that 
he spent 11 a lengthy period in Par-lis.ment without gi v-
ing rise to the suspicion that he would one day lead 
it II• 
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in the nickrn1me "Honest George". As often happens, the 
relationship between the Prime Mini st er and Finance Mini st er 
became a subject f'or jeering,· so that Forbes was depicted as 
being unable to make a· decision without permission :from Coates. 
Criticism of both is implied in the remarks of' a newspaper 
correspondent: 1. ttyfo are ti red of Government apologists and 
want representatives who will ·look·-after this island. • ••• With 
all Mr. Coates's faults and they are legion, he certainly looks ) 
after the North Island and will be able to do so as long as we 
send him men to dance to his f'iddling 11 • 
It was inevitable thEtt the heaviest responsibility 
should fall on Coates in his key position and, being ten years 
younger, he di splayed a vigour and enterprise that v.rere not 
seen in the Prime Minister. He might win grudging admiration 
but nothing warmer. "He had little cultural background . . . . 
his careful dressing a.nd innocent swagger irritated some . . . . 
and it is certain that he was the victim of slanderous gossip." 2 • 
Though he was the leader of the Government's Right VVing, he was 
illogically charged with Socie.lism, because he had added to his 
secretarial staff monetary experts whose views were unorthodox 
to an older school of financiers who hsd not been set problems 
concerning economic chaos. The ordinary mFJn, understanding 
little and suffei->ing much, looked on Coates BS the author of the 
troubles that were complained of on All sides. It was only 
1. "Press", Novewber 21st, 1935. 
2. Mulgr:in, "From Track to Highway", p.117-118. 
with difficulty that he reteined his seat in 1935. 
Among those who lost their seats• was W. Downie 
Stewart, who would have been a VA luable Opposition member. 
Having withdrawn from the battle before he could be connni tted 
to mea sures which, in bringing relief to some, a 1 ws ys a f oni sed 
more, he retained the esteem of opponents as well as supporters. 
It was regretted 1" that "his financial and economic knowledge 
and experience, his lucid and temperate criticism" would no 
longer be at the service of the House. Among other candidates 
to be rejected were some who have since entered the ranks and 
risen to Cabinet positions in the first Natioll81 Party Govern-
ment. If the people saw their abilities then, however, unhappy 
memories of their colleagues' administration blotted out the 
vision. 
LABOUR CANDIDATES: 
There was a curious willingness on the part of con-
servative critics of Labour policies to make generous testimon-
ies of the personal worth of Labour leaders. Even if not 
above reproach (Mr. Semple's langusge was already notable) they 
we:ve acl<::nowledged 2 • to be "men of high ideals and some capacity'', 
but i10· confidence was felt in their fin8.ncial abilities. This 
opinion was based on distrust of' their policy, which seemed im-
possible o,f flttPinment, and on their inexperience, nq,t. on their 
ability to understand the cornplexi ties of' economic problems. 
n,robRbly their opponents would not have Bgreed with the c:oimnen-
1. "Round T9ble 11 , Vol. 26, p. 427. 
2. 11Mer•cantile Gazette", 1935, Vol. 2, p. 1,034. 
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1 • 
tator who clsimed that they were better in:formed than typical 
members o:f other• parties but they vrould h:::ive conceded ths t the ) 
Labour cPndidates were "thoughtful and reasonsble men". It 
may hPve been felt that it would be dangerous to the hopes of 
Nation.elists to persuade the electors to reject the lures of 
Labourf by attempting to belittle their candidates. Their 
popularity was obvious, and of recent years their public utter-
ances had been of a more discreet character. The class war 
and uncompromising Socialism of' earlier years were restricted 
imports. It was found that home-grown philosophies suited 
New Zealanders better. 
The previous leA.der, H. E. Hollancl, had been a militant 
leader who expressed himself with U.nbridl1?d passion. M. J. 
Savage, who succeeded him in 1934, quickly rose to great heights 
of popularity. He was no less determined then Holl::::md but 
w~s more gently persuasive. A man who looked so modest and 
benevolent could scarcely be represented by his critics as a 
rabid revolutionary. It was a judicious move for Savage to 
begin stumping the country as early as January of election year. 
It gave the electorates a. chance to see him, and his party hA.d 
time to build up s picture of' 8 successor to Seddom - a leader 
from the people for the people. 
In April of' 1935, 53 Ls-bour c2ndid.stes had Glr1 •:::8dy 
been chosen - 45 of these were elected. The work of selection 
was done by Labour Representation Corruni ttees and their choice 
1. Morrell, 11Hew Zeslnnd 11 , p. 227. 
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was &pproved by the National Executive. Altogether 70 can-
did8tes were f'ound, six EuropeF!l1 e1ector8tes being left uncon-
tested as the jsrty was thought to have little chance of succ-
, 1 • 
ess in these. The decision to avoid probable and costly 
de:f,eets was justified when the results showed that, with the 
exception of' Coates's seat, Kai~T,>oi, all these electorates were 
won by Independents - sitting members who pol1ed v.rell. 
INDEPENDENTS: 
It is at variE:nce with the name of' Independent to treat 
these candidates as a group, but some general features stand 
out from the rniscella.neous information about them. It would 
appes.r· that among their nwnbers wer•e some of the more articulate 
and reflective men. 
2. Of the five ,.,letters received from C8.n-
dida.tes about the political situation in 1935, thr·ee were :from 
Independents and two from Democrats. Added to this ere the 
results o:f the voting, which show th8t the averBge Independent 
was much more favoursbly received thBn most Democr8 ts. Then 
eight of the thirty-six :pskeha Independents had hsd previous 
Pa rliamenta.r:l service averaging fr•om ten to eleven yeArs. This 
is the more remark=ible when we remember how the Independent was 
attacked by sll partieR as being politically ~seless, as lacking 
support in the House, and as having no mCTB'tlrn.n a subordinate pBrt 
in lsw-rnaking. 
1. According to the Ns.tional Secretm"';;r' s report on the election 
in the Lr:;.bouT' Party's Annual Con:rerence Report, 1936. 
These wer·e districts with weak L0bour BrAnches 8nd little 
money. 
2. In snswer -:o 8 letter and guestionmi.ir•e sent by the writer 
·to ebou.t 110 c8nd.idetes. Only 50 questionn8ir•es were 
returned. See copy in Appendix A. 
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Among these men were some who hsd previously belonged 
to the CoRlition but had chosen to le8ve it. Beceuse of' his 
dissatisf'action over the treatment of the unemployed, A.M. 
S8muel hBd sa.id thF1 t he f'eJ.t tlwt, by being independent, he 
could better represent his constituency) than by being e member 
of a party which paid so little heed to the eppeals of the suffer-
ing poor". 1 • Other members of' the Coalition who had with-
drawn f'rom it were A.J. Stcillworthy and W.A. Veitch, who contest-
ed the election as DemocI•a.ts, and H. Atmore, who, though calling 
himself' a Democrat, was spoJ~en of and re-elected as 8.n Independ-
ent, who had consistently supported the Labour Party. Two 
other ex-Goa li ti on members were R. A. Wright and D. McDougall. 
Wright at least on one occe.sion, however, returned to his former 
s llegiance and with Wilkinson, another Independent, supported 
the Government against a no-confidence motion on September• 11th, 
1935. 2• 
It was discovered by most Independents tha.t their name 
was only en i1lusj on; that if they vmnted sny hope of election 
they had to hitch their waggons to one of the larger stars; 
but there was little hope of their being elected if the local 
Labour or National cAndidate.was at all supportable. Some-
times this discour8ged th~n sltogether. An Independent of 
Otr: ki Viii thdrew in favour of :ci L.<:ibour cancliclat e • .) • Pthers who-
stayed the coui·se/ ,?,ave rather' rnconseqilentH1l reasons·.for 
1. "Press", Christchurch, November 18th, 1935. 
2. P.D., Vol. 21+2 1 September 11th, 1935, p. 21+6. 
3. 11 New Zealand Herald", Nov. 1st, 1935. 
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following s pPrticular party. L.C. Walker 1• would support 
the Gove1,nment in r~ no-confidencE:: motion because it hed set u:p 
a committee to investigate his plan for a new stBte in Southland. 
It was Duff's desire to see the person~l of Parliament changed, 
so thP.t should Labour be retur•nec1 to power he would not use his 
vote, if elected, to "jockey them out" 2 • Other Independents 
kept aloof. In reply to the usual question about his reaction 
to a no-confidence motion, V.H. Potter declared that his policy 
was to be straightforward and conscientious "without playing 
3. 
to the politics 1 gallery. 11 This did not rec01mnend him 
to the elector, who wished to have the representative most like-
ly to be in a position to have his intended prog:rannne implement-
ed. It mus": have been galling for the Independent Country 
Party and other monetary reformers who lmd worked so earnestly 
in the cause of social credit to be rejected in favour of the 
LBbour Part;l which he.d stolen their· thunder. It ms de capital 
out of the mor·tgci.ge~' s bitterness and out of the work of the 
monetsr;;,r re:f orm movement. According to Penniket, 4. Savage 
admitted more th8n once that it was the work of the reformers 
that put Labour in. What they h8d advocated ea. stBte control 
I 
o:f' the Reserve B~1nk, socis l credit for housing and public ·vvorks, 
ci. guaranteed price f'or the d8ir;y exporter EJ.nd cash pG;yrnents to 
mothers with de;)t:mdent children, Lr-bour W8S able to tt:lrn the 




"?ress", Christchurch, November 18th, 1935. 
0. Duff (Hurunui) els peported by the 11Pressll, November 12, 
1935. 
From e. newspBper clipping (with no date or reference)sent. 
by Potter to the writer. 
Set:; manuscript p.17 of Candid.stes. 
SAVAGE 
HISLOP 
No Independent could hsve been u118wAre of his slender 
hope of being returned. 1,iost might feel they h8 a been f'ortun-
ste if their deposit was returned and if they could feel that 
in some sm&ll measure they had served to expose the political 
tricks of' opponents, gs.ining for themselves the full voting 
.weight they merited. 
!HE DZMOCRATS: 
It was not inten¢l.ed by the origin8.l movers of the Demo-
erst Party to go to the polls iri great strength. The candid-
Btes were to be a select few, but as the organisation changed, 
with control passing from Auckland to the Wellington hea,dquarters, 
so the complexion of' tl1e ~arty changed. Instead of 15 candid-
ates, 53 was the final score. Perhaps if the organiser's time 
1. 
had not been partly taken up in quarrels with the Auckland 
originators of the Democrsts, there mi0ht heve been 8.n even 
greater offering. It had been under consideration. In his 
T' 2. inaugural speech, h1slop referred to the expectstion of hHv-
ing e candidete for al~ of the 80 electorates. 
Hislop himself was expected to :poll well. He W8S a 
barrister 9.nd solicitor who, though t.hree times Meyor o:f \Velling-
ton, he.d he.d no rn:ttional poli ttc:81 experience. Be was by re-
pute e capable administrator and e. lucid s:;iee.ker. Whether or 
not he would h2ve thought so at the timt:; of the c2mp2.tgn, Davy 
1 • 
2. 
-, ?O J ttr n ~.:r " 0 t l ::;upra, p. _ , ? .so ._\. ,,_,.11. , c OJer 
"Evening Post", October ?ncl., 1935. 
19th, 1935. 
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1 -'-1 • • , t 1. expressec 1,11e Ol'J 111 on ..1.a er 
no w.'.u .. mt.h und "le:ft the audience cold", in spite of his polished 
speeches. 
Like Hislop, meny other• Democrats had served on local 
bodies. One candidate was a woman 2 · who had formerly been 
Mayoress of Dunedin. .Although many Democrats were experienced 
in public service, only A.J. Stallworthy1
1N.A. Veitch and J.B. 
Donald h8d had any Parliamentary experience. The party con-
sisted mainly of business and professional men Hnd. some f'armers. 
Among an imposing galaxy of sn ex-professor, a former Director 
of Education a retired lrmy c6olonel and various company direct-
' I 
ors, Veitch's engine-driver background seemed a little out of 
place. The cause of the Democrat's defeat lay less in the 
g_ua.li ty of the candidates than in the policy, the strength of 
the opposing forces (among Vihich must be numbered the news-
papers) Bnd. the lack of Democrat propaganda. 
Since it ha.s not been possible to complete the personal 
recorc1s of each candid8te, thet·e are necessarily gaps in tnfor-
mat ion. Over 100 ages have had to be omitted from the calcul-
ations so that the following tables c:o;_n be considered only approx-
ims.te. To overcome dif':ficul ti es of' 8 ccufi:1cy here rnecli.::'.n ages 
11~ive be en used to give 8. wore typi col survey o:f members 8 nc1 
candidates. 
1. In ~n interview with the writer in Septffinber, 1948. 
2. M1~s. R. s. Black, vi1ho wrote "Sunshine a.nd Sheclow11 , contain-





A.GR IfotJ_ Leb. :'.:lt:'!l. Ind. Othei>s TOTALS 
-( 
70-75 4 - - 1 5 
65-69 6 3 3 3 15 
60-64 7 5 2 2 1 (Lib. ) 17 
55-59 15 Me:lim 7 4 1 27 
I 
50-54 10 13 Med. 4 Med. 3 Med. 30 Median 
45-49 2 12 6 3 23 
40-4!+ 4 6 1 1 1 (Lib.) 13 
35-39 2 1 1 3 1 (Comm.) 8 
30-34 1 4 1 - 6 
25-29 - 3 - - 3 
51 (74) 58 ( 73) 22 (56) 17 (42) 147 
Figures in brackets show total nUi11ber of' candidates 
of a particular party, indicating that complete I'ecords are not 
available. 
AGES OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT. TABLE 5. 
--------AGE Parliamt. Parliamt. Lab. Na t. Ind. 
1931 1935 
70-75 2 1 - - 1 
65-69 6 8 3 2 3 
60-64 12 10 6 4 
55-59 16 Med. 12 6 5 1 
50-54 16 16 Median 12 4 
45-49 12 I 6 6 \ 
40-1+4 2 I 7 4 






It will be seen from Trble IV thot the most co:mmon 
s.ge fo1~ all c0ndidates in 1935 we s between 50 and 54 yeers, 
but that the National csndidstes were :from 5 to 10 years olde1' 
than those of other parties. That the Government should be 
older than their opponents at the end of a term o:r office/ was 
inevitable. Usually the balance is restored by deaths, resig-
nations and finally by new blood after each election, but Co-
alition members began as an older group (see tabJe V) than the 
candidates of four years later~ Their median age in 1931 
was between 54 and 59 years and so it rema.ined at the election 
of 1935. 
Part of the reason for this is attributed to Forbes. 
He was 13.ccused 1 " of being over-loyal to his colleB.gues, of' 
rewarding those who ha.d been helpful by appointing them to 
of'fi ce. He had not rejuvena.ted the Government and, if ever 
bold young spirits were needed, it was to find solutions for 
depression difficulties which orthodox :finance seemed incapable 
of mastering. 
On eonsideration of the election results, it appears 
that advanced age is scarcely a handicap in politics. Mope 
than halcf' of the re-elected National members were older than the 
median age for the members of Parliament, nnd f'our· of' the Inde-
1. By A. J. StHllworthy in a letter to the writer, 21+-7-1+8. 
This may be the s+.atement of a dis0pr1ointed office-
seeker. Stallworthy was Minister of Health in the 
United Government. 
45. 
pendents could only be celled elderly. The electors in weigh-
ing e.dvencing years F1 gPinst experience 8nd useful services must 
have :preferred proven older men to inexperienced younger ones. 
This wss to be expected from conservative electors. 
The young men standing for election were nearly all 
in the Labour I'Bnks, and 8.11 but one were elected. Apart 
:from T. H. Mccombs, who was :five months old in Parliamentary 
experience, they were all untried members. 
1935 PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE OF ELECTED MEMBERS. TABLE 6. 
Numbers of Candidates ii (~t,.1J ~. 1935 
.12.li 
' '• .. , 
Years of Lebour Ifational Independent Total Number of 
Service Cand.idat es" 
17 or more 1 2 1 4 3 
15 
-
16 4 2 1 




9 - 10 4 2 6 6 
7 - 8 4 4 3 11 
5 - 6 2 1 3 9 
3 - 4 6 2 8 14 
2 - 1 4 
Less 1 1 1 
None 27 2 1 30 7 
53 18 6 77 63 
~-----~-~ A vere.ge 
Service 4. 3Yrs. 10.1 Yrs. 11.6 Yrs. 6.4 Yrs. 6.7 Yrs. 
46. 
fARLIAMF.NTARY EXPERIENCE: 
There j_s little to choose r)etween the old Parliament 
and the new one in exper•ience in th0 House. · 
service of members of the 1931 Pa1'liarnent was 6. 7 years whereas 
the new members averaged. 6. l+ yes rs. That is, in the aggre-
gate, retiI1ing members were slightly more experienced in Par-
liamentary sff'airs. The individual sections, however, are 
·very different. The Labour members included 27 men who had 
no previous connection with the House. In the total figures 
their inexperience was offset by the high average service of 
the re-elected National Independent members. Amongst these 
were Forbes with 27 years to his credit, Coates with 2~. and 
R. A. Wright (Ind.) with 24. On the Labour side Mr. Fraser's 
17 years heads the list, 
EDUCATION OJt., CANDIDATES: TABLE 7. 
National Labour Democrat Independent Others 
.. . 
Primary 54 58 22 23 8 
Seconda.ry 34 32 16 20 7 
University 22 15 11 10 3 
EDUCATION: 
The search for inf'ormation about: the education of 
candidates was mGd.e more difficult by the reluctance of some 
men to disclose their secrets. Oft.en no mention of it is 
1 • 
m8de in their biographies or in pert3omi1 histories given to 
newspariers. It can only 1Je assumed, since most of these men 
1. e.g. s.s in Scholef'ield' s 11 New ZeslPnd Dictiona1'y of Biograph;y 
or a·who' s Who in New Zea1Rnd 11 • 
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we1~e l)etween 50 a.nd 60, or younger, th;.:~ t they woul<J., under the 
Education Act of 1877, have hF,d the r·e11u ired P,le1°1entary school:-
ing until thiPteen years old. Others, by their bristling or 
defensive tone, hBve tscitly acknowledged inadeguste schooling, 
stating that they lear•ned in the "school of adversi ty11 or from 
11 life' s eX})erience0 • M8ny h8ve given details of their ef'forts 
to educe.te themselves. One Iruiependent candi da.t e spent the 
whole of the 1907 session of Parliament in New Zealand, listen-
ing to .the debates in the House, and other periods am9unting to 
months, reading in libraries in New Zealand and overseas. 
Although more information was available about the 
education of L8oour than of other cendidRtes, they had propor-
tionelly fewer university-trained men thsn the other groups. 
These :figures do not take into sccount, however, the numerous 
other sources of learning besides formal schoollng. lll~=my of 
the Labour leGders spent evening hours after work in night 
schools and were connected with the Ylorkers' Educational Assoc-
iation of New Zealand as organisers e.nd tutors. Others hAve 
attended technical and connne:ecial schools and hBve mastered 
courses of study, either> self-imposed, or under the direction 
1 • 
of various educationsl institutions. 
1. ''Round Table" Vol. 26, Max•ch 1936, p.432: "The .Celibre of 
the L8bour Part;:,r has made s favouP0ble tm:9ression, 
And the general opinion is th8t the House of Represent-
atives vdll be superior· in education, intelligence 
and. experience to that just deceased". 
A TYPICAL ADVERTISEMEWL' 
PALMERSTQN ELECT.fiRSI 
REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD SUPPORT 
J. A. -~·NA H 
THE 0 NA TIQNAL CANDIDATE 
Holda Record for rvice which la bard to equal in New Zealand. 
ED AS THE ,WORKERS' FRIEND 
30 years Chamber of Commerce--3 years President. 
J year Borough Councillor. · 
15 years (consecutive) Mayor. 
26 years Hospital Board. 
26 years Foxton Harbour Board. . 
9 years President and Chairman Patriotic Society-War Work. 
22 years Chairman District Nurse Committee. 
3 years Chairman and Founder Gorge 69ard of Control. 
5 years Chairman Palmerston N.-Kairanga River Board. 
15 years Member and Chairman P.N. Fire Board. 
23 years President Municipal Band. 
16 years Chairman Terrace End School Committee. 
4 years Chairman School Committee8' Association. 
24 years Member, and Chairman 3 years, High ~hool Board 
of Governors. 
1 7 years your Member of Parliament. 
12 years Chairman Manawatu-Oroua Power Board. 
11 years President and Founder of N.Z. Power Boards' 
Association. 
22 year& .( 17 years Vice-President and 1 year President) 
Manawatu A. & P. Association. 
21 years President Manawatu Bowling Centre. 
27 years Director and Chairman N.Z. Fanner&' Dairy Union. 
23 years Director and Chairman Manawatu Permanent Build· 
ing and Investment Society, 
VOTE FOR J. A. NASH 
1+8. 
LOCAL GOVE~".Nl/~31\T SERVI CE~ 
One of the most persistent educators is contsct in 
de.iJ.y life with the public. Some candidates participated to 
the full in public 11.fe, gainin~; varied experience end under-
standing of. local aff'Rirs through service on councils and boards. 
One candidate; J. A .• Nash of ?Blmerston.? had printed a.n imposing 
• array of services he had rendered. · • 
Under the heading "Local Government" is included not 
only service on city, borough or county councils, but ~lso member-
ship of any elected loca 1 body providing some public service,: 
e.g. harbour, hospital, highways, river control and similar public 
boards. The m8 jori ty of candidates in every part;y had some 
record of local government service. Of those actually elected, 
about 72/o had served on some local council or board, and this 
percentage rose even higher (77%) for a small section of the 
membeI'S, those who had neve1, been elected to the House before. 
It would seem, then, that local councils provide stepping stones 
to ParliRment House. 
OCCUPATIONS: 
It was said of the House of Rel)resentatives dissolved 
in 1935 th2,t its members were 0 associated with as many as thi i-.ty 
. " 1 • different vocations • Including the Speaker of' the House 
(Sir Charles Ststh2m) who retired in 1935) "there are ten lawyers, 
of whom six are in the Cos1i ti on P8rty GoverTu11ent but none now 
in the Ministry. This is the fj_rst time for mBny yeBrs that 
the Minj_stry is without a representative of' the 18w". 2 • 
1. Democrat Psrty Of':ficisl Hr.ndbook. 
2. ibid. 
>11t, See illustra.tion fBcing p.48. 
This situation was deplored by 0. C. Mazengarb, when aslrnd if 
he approved of LI» Ii'orbes, as f'srmer holding the position of 
1 • Attorney-General. 
The comment was m8de "Industries, cormnerc e end ski 11-
ed occupations other thsn farming have remarkHbly few repres-
2. 
entatives but there are enough farmers to form a national union". 
There were thirty-five farmers in the House,of whom 
thirty-one supported the Government. The Labour Opposition 
conta~ned only one ex-farmer. Still others made a hobby of 
farming in addition to their activities as comp8ny directors, 
Csbinet Ministers, race-horse owners and businessmen. 
This predominance of farmers in the Government was 
criticized. by the Democrat Party, which could point to a thorous-h-
ly repr'esentati ve selection of candidates for election. They 
did include farmers (dairying and sheep farmers, orchardists, 
beekeepers, poultry raisers Find tobacco growers) but also had 
represen:batives of a variety of other• occups.tions. "The Demo-
c1"ats number among their ranks •••• barristers, a master painter, 
a doctor, a retired clerg;>nnsn, merch8nts, accountents, company 
secretaries, business men, msyors of some of the principal cit-
ies and boroughs, a former director of Ec1ucation, a gold_ miner, 
a noted ·authority on afforestation, 2c former Mayoress of e large 
city end leading men from trade 8Ild 1Bbour circles 11 • 3. 
1. "Dominion11 , Wellington, Nov. 22nd, -1935._ 
2. Democr>et P.cirty Offici~Jl HPnc1book. 
j. j_1Jid. 
50. 
OCCUPATIONS OF 1935 ELECTION CANDIDA TES. TABLE 8. 
FJ-::;5 Cend.id::-;tes. 
<' 1935 Parliement. 





Farmer 27 12 
Coy.Director 7 
Lawyer 8 3 
Business 5 17 






































































































1. Iviiscellsneous includes 11 retired arm;y colonel, e. seaman, 
8. bA nk president, two housewives and B miner. 
51. 
It is 8pparent f'rom T2.ble 8 thrt if the Lsbour 
Party ws.s not guilty of offering such a restricted type of 
candid8te as the National Party did, yet it too tended to be 
rather sectionsl. Businessmen/ and party and union of'ficials 
over-emphasized the city electorcite, althougJ: there were twelve 
farmers, ten of whom were· elected, to stRnd in the interests of' 
rural voters. The ten secretaries and·off'icials employed in 
party work and trade union positions represented mainly the work-
ing class of' industrial and city areas, and f'rom the nature of' 
their employment/ would have to put party considerations first, 
rather thBn the multiple deme.nds of thej.r electorates. That 
is
1
being tied to the programme of a ~arty on which he was partly 
dependent for his living, such s man could never be an independ-
ent agent representing the whole of his electorate. 
In some ways, however, the trade union secretary was 
a more valuable candidate than most. He was usuelly a man 
1 • 
who had had to make personal sacrifices to put the interests 
of f'ellow workers first. His pe:rsistence v1ould surely betoken 
a man with more than usual interest in the common good. This 
enthusiasm :for public service could not fail to illrnnine his 
Parliamentary undertakings. 
1. According to Dell, Past President of the Amalgamt=ited Soc-
iety of Railwq;>r Servants~ prior to 1936 if s worlrnr 
were elected Union secretary his employer (sometimes 
s Government Department) usually dismissed him immed-
iately; or,.might dismiss a msn merely for being s memb-
er of the Lebour Party. The ~ecretary was then de-
pendent on the snmll income he received from ri'nion 
dues. 
52. 
It cannot be cl.simed :for Lsbour th2,t their cs.ndidetes 
had a monopoly of altruism. Pol} t ici8 ns unc1oubt edly su:ff'er 
many inconveniences and expose themselves to finencisl dangers, 
endure lone; sittings~/ and tedious speakers, invite damaging 
criticism which may threeten their private hs,ppiness snd never 
know security. They cannot be wholly compensated by their 
sa.laries, opportunities and prestige. There must be in most 
of them a conviction that speci8l abilities or adva.nte.ges 
should be used to.benefit as many as possible of their country-
men. It is certain that most of these candidates had unusual 
qualities of personality, character or capacity, even the un-
successful ones, and the much-criticized defeated G·overrunent. 
No matter whet their several differences of policy and convict-
ion were, there was a common core of secrif'icie.l spirit. It 
is only a pity that party Government e'nables the policy, and not 




BecAuse of the p1•edomins.nce of poverty t.rnd insec-
urity in the lives of most l;ew Ze8l8nders during depression 
years, the parti ss concerned themselves 2 lmost wholly with 
economic and fincia.i proposals for continuing and accelerating 
national recovery. This preoccupstion with domestic well-
being hes been typical of New Zealand politics and is re tural, 
too, in a nBtion so isoloted/ geographically and so well-connect-
ed1 diplometically. Discussions on foreign affairs evoke 
little interest compared with concern for the maintenance of 
the nBtioMl living-standard. Vfl1ere matters concerning the 
Le8gue of Nations were of merely ace.demic interest, immigr·ation 
policies could arouse questioning ancJ. newspPper correspondence. 
A few sentences from the plAtfor·m and an inch of space 
in a newspaper sufficed to pledge the NEt.ionsl PB.rty to support 
the I,eague of Nations und co-opeI'ete with Brit.Bin end other 
parts of the Empire in matters of defence. Other parties 
and c2ndidstes took the same tone in their perfunctory referenc-
es to internatiomil end Empire affairs. This was the year 
o:f the It8lian assault on Abyssinia, which h8.d_ aroused more 
than usual interest in mR tt ers of defence but did not shake 
the nation out of its lethargy. The gener8l attitude was 
voiced by W.J. Polson, member for Stratford, when rliscussing 
mili tGry sAnctions~he s8id thE-,t 11 the mere suggestion of c1ny 
I 
such 8ction hr~s been expres2ly re:;mdj_eted by Hie MP jesty' s 
54. 
Government, s.nd, of course, is out of the c1uestion for Hew 
'/I 
!l 1 • ZealPnd. Minor criticisms offered by Savage did not dis-
guise his reluctance to be any further involved. During the 
campaign Labour candidates were no different from others in 
the scant ref'erences they made to overseas matters, except 
thos~ affecting the economic position of this country. It 
was with the latter in mind that Hislop 2• pledged the Demo-
crats to keep the·spirit of the Ottawa agreements - a euphon-
ious way of warning farmers that they would have to accept con-
tinued export quotas and restrictions if Empire co-operation 
required it. The only person found to disagree with the Gov-
ernment decision of 1931 to restrict irnrnigra:h.ts.i.wi th insuffic-
ient capital was L. C. Walker (Ind.) who had a plan 3. which 
would obviate any conflict with New Zealanders in need of em-
ployment. It was rare for candidates to spend time on such 
topics. They found plenty of domestic problems to discuss. 
There was a similar lack of attention in electoral 
speeches to constitutional affairs. Though the country quota 
was usually c:1 ttacked by Labour members, it vvas not made an 
issue in 1935}as the Labour Party did not wish to antagonise 
farmers. There were, however, loud denunications of the 
Coalition's step in lengthening the life of Parliament by one 
year. This was held to be un..;.democratic. An amendment to 
1. P.D., Vol. 243, p.505. 
2. ttpress", October 2nd, 1935. 
3. Mentioned in corres})ondence in ,,Press 11 , November 14th, 
1935. 
55. 
the ~nectoro.l Act W38 promised for the restorntion of tri~ 
Earlier~ the :Dic:;bour plE1 tf'orrn hnd included e.nother 
consti tutionBl plcmk - proportionel representation.· In LBb-
our's lean years such a system would heve gjven their candidstes 
greater chances of obte ining seot s. Iiorrell observed that 
the dem8nd for propor·tional representation vms no longer in-
eluded in the l)latforrn after the Party's Amma.l Conference in 
2. 
March, 193!+. Ho doubt by this time having twenty-four 
elected members and hope of mrony more to come as the Coelition's 
unpopularity showed little sign of ws.ning, the need had faded. 
After their fiJ•st clismay st the 8ppearence of the Democrat 
Psrty, the Lsl)our members regi:1ined their conviction that this 
year they were closer then ever before to power. So complete-
ly had. they lost interest in the 8pplicstion of the pref'erential 
vote to New Zealsnd elections, thet they were held to be the 
reason for t.he Goverrrrnent' s ignoJ•ing last-minute s.gi tat ion for 
ad<i>1)tion of such a system; "it fel:1 rs that such a chsnge v10uld 
invite destructive criticism from the Lubour Party". 3. The 
agi te.tion ce.rne from R.A. Wright (Ind.), who consider·ed that 
preferential voting should be introcl1_tced in view of the large 
nlunber of c::endH1-ates of:fering thernsel ves f'or election. 4· 
1 • "Press 11 , October 31st, 1935. see also Paul, 
~ 
"Hum8nism in Politics", p.99. 
2. Horrell, "New Zeslsnd", p.230. 
3. _E.y "RounG'. T~bJ.e 11 Vol. 26, 193.5~ p. 205. 
4. P.:0. Vol. 2L+2$ p.211+. 
56. 
The e1·y was tciken ur) outside the House by the Democrr-its 1mt 
It was not clef1r wh2"t beD.t:;i''i t could be gGined from 
preferential voting unless it Bceomp~·niecl pr>oportiorn:i.1 rep-
resentation, 0nd the l8tter could scC1.rc12.ly achieve f8.irer 
representation of minorities in New Zeal8nd 1 s single-member 
t •t . 1. cons i uencies. Besid.es) it obviously could not be made 
applicable without B. major electore l upheaval and with an 
election pending nofone w2nted to experiment. 
~ ' 
Probably some 
of the GoveI'I1li1ent members later regretted their lack of' inter-
est in Wright's scheiues but>confronted with the choice
1 
they 
preferred to gnmble. 
W11en the Cofllition came to the end of their lsst 
Parli8mentar·y session, in spite of pBrtiel recovery from the 
depression, they could not feel confident at the prospect 
ahead. They had h2d their extra ye2r, though the Lrbour Party 
raged 8lld the fr8des Unions sulked. But what CO!J.ld the:y now 
show as justification? There could not very welJ. be a volte-
f8ce to optimism tind generous spending policies. Their pol-
icy hPd to be sober to lJe8r out th13 sombre wsrnings of the 
past. There was little rews.rd now in being 8.ble to tske ad-
v2ntC1ge of 1)etter prices for farm produce to :promi. se new 
1. Members using the term 11proportionel representation" did 
not seem to be awflre thft the s~rste1n could not tie c.ipplie 
to New Zee.land 1 s single-rnembe:r eonsti t.uencies; nor 
wr:rn it clear thet they knew the dj_fference betv'ieen 
11 prefe:f'entir:il voting" snd the second. b8llot, which 
had 8lreRdy be8n tried in New Zealsnd. See Lipson 1 
"PoJ.i tics of E(1ueli t.yu, p. 190. 
57. 
me:J.2.ures. The :wnsing SUY'V6;y was c1ec:r·j ed as 11winclow·-
dr-essi11g". If' it llF-d at laet oeen found i1osEdble to give 
relief, long+clemoured for, to certain beneficiaries of the 
State, thei1~ opponents took the credit :for foPcing the Govern-
ment to give way to popular demand. 
Lee's forebodings 1 • th&.t the Government would attempt 
to win people ~i th a "prosperity Budget 11 and with slogRns 
like 11Happ;>~ Days are here again" j expressed the uncertainty 
that periodically shook Labour's confidence. He was not the 
only one to speculRte thus. The journ8l "Tomorrow" surmised 2• 
that the f'arroers would be offered an ettrscti ve nm rketing agree-
ment with Britein and th::d. the solidly LelJour city electorstes 
would be :wooed with promises thst something ¥1oulrl be done about 
the housing shortage. 
The Labour progrmmne, which had been before the elect-
ors for months, was re-af'firmed in the sumnl8ry "Twelve Points" 
on Sept ember 9.th. The Budget came out on September> 18th. 
A grs.du8l loosening-up was the best thst the Nationalists could 
offer. No general benefits could be announced though 111E.ny 
promises were rnede. A month previousl~pensioners 8Dd war 
vetersns hed hBd increase2 in their pen<-ions; now it was the 
turn of some civil serwnts to h2ve the euts in their wt.•ges 
restored. ·No pertictJlf;r effort w<.1c~ n0de to win over' the 
1. See P.D., Vol. 242, p.~05. 
2. "Tomorrmv 11 ~ August 3rd, 1935. 
58. 
l8bonrin.z-c18 sses. To the 1:msinesE~ cornrrruni ty only incidental 
a ss:l. st::, nc e vrn. s p r·omi sed. !1 ny vo 1unti'1 ry act ion by inu1ist.riE. 1-
ists to r•eorg~ nis~J c-nd co-ol'dim~1te im~trnt1•j_es of ''proved effic-
iency 11 would be supported by Government lL::gi slati on if re-
1. 
quired, 
Most newspapers ::.:p:;::iroved of the cautious lifting of 
the economising measures but the 11Evening Post 11 2• wondered 
why the Government, instead of ending the yeer with a credit 
bal:=ince of £1,333,000., vvould not "lighten t~xaticin so that em-
ployers other than the Stete could p8ss something on to the 
consumers on their mvn". This vvss the rnost critic8l comment; 
other newsyfipers rnHde no comp la int ebout the slow relief from 
depression tPxes. 
To their farmer sUI)}_)OI'ters, the Government off'ered 
nothing more th0n the concessions r:lres.dy in operation end their 
shBre in r-n;y general benefits. It was pointed out thE t there 
he c1 been P n '~~'~;rec iB ble rj_ se in the exi)ort vn lue of f'E, rm produce 
since 1931-2 3 • Rnd becBuse of this Fn increase ~lso in the 
VBlue of bank deposits. The:: Government would sustsin rn:1tion2.l 
production by continuing to avoid extrAVGgsnt expenditure, so 
_:r:n,eventi ng i ncren sed te xc:.ti on; by promoting the; co:ntj_ mwnc e of 




"Press", October 29th, 1935. 
Se-::1ter11rJcr 10th, -1935. 
See 13-et:glehole: 11 l'Tew Ze<~lr1 nd", p. 1 C.2, f_~ lso /\ppendb:: to 
l).D, 193L~-5, B.6, X''VII1• 
i:;. ,;. the b::cnl;: overdT·aft r,::;te 
t (') Lj~lrj l•'"l Jl("\7111. ff-;JI"'QQlf . ....... ·2/0 l .-/ _; 1 , .L ...Ji....."-' ' 
drop:;,-:ied 
October 
:frorn 7,-; in 1930; 
59. 
If the; f'2r~·:ier clif:. not f'ind this ,<=;uf'f'icientl~r r·eassur-
ing, there were additional Pttrsctions in the general benefits: 
there were promises of surve,ys of' soil, mineral 8nd other re-
sources; increased public works; free milk for school child-
~-
t 1 . b f- · 1 · t. · op~' d ren; ex ension of i rF.Jl'Y Hel~l .. 1es,-· improve educational 
conditions;and a. national housing scheme was to be ls.unched. 
Though not p1'0Vided for in the Budget, 9. ne. ti onal superannua t-
ion scheme Bnr'l he?lth service were to be provided "e.s soon r,s 
f'inancis l conditions permit". 
Since the collspse of prices for farm produce in 1921, 
there hscl been nore acceptance of' the necessity for subjecting 
prima17 producers to cont:r·ol of },of:rds regul2ting c1ut1 nti ty and 
rnarketi ng of exports. Aft er 1931, markets in Cc-nada, Lust-
relia End the United States for New Zeeland butter and cheese 
we:Pe closed, while 3ritein ellowed only mutton end l:::rnb to be 
imported untaxed. The D2i1•y Produce r:ind. Liee.t :t!Jxport Control 
i3oE. rel s were followed b:r o~:.heI's in s.ddi t ion to V!O< ri ous co-orcUn-
The o~igin2J. intention of keeping the Boerds 
They h2 c1 been 
f; ,.,, ·j·m~-,) C' c i" () ·)-, O If 1 • 
...... \.. ··-'-~'-- l1_1 
1 • 
60. 
of' the Co£1 lit i on\;i)ernici ous "Ste te Socialt sm 11 • They them-
selves ::1._:iuld rtotr:·.in only ac1vi.E;or7 boc\.ies. Co11ver2ely, L1bour 
ing, lloing the intePmediPry bnying of· 01.l primery produce, 
whether for forei2:n or lo·~s_l con:_:rnm:ption. For the time being, 
LBbour rnade \most of the bene:fi ts it would bring to the dairy 
f'a rmer. 
The National Party, having tried to appease the farm-
er, could do little more. Undoubtedly de si c;nea_ to 'vin over 
the townsman, who hRd been the worst suf:f erer· from unemployment, 
the policy of exr>'.0 nsi on of public works end consequent re-
absorption of' un·:J;i:1loyed menj was ulso o:f rwtion:.-il j_nterest. 
- - I 
A positive policy like thi2 could restore the confidence that 
was needed to ore.n .iew !:jnte1•9rises ::1nc1 fresh avenues o:f employ-
ment. 
Wor1'-::ers might e.lso lrnve been interested in the Nation-
2li stl!--3 .:0romise to m2.intain adeq_uet e ·working ·~ ondi ti ons by 
adop+,ion of relevsnt geneN'l st2nd.srds. Speci~l attention was 
to be given to ss.feguarding boy apprentices. Tb.ese worthy 8.nd 
inex~pensi ve concess1.ons vrert: trifling comp2red. w-: th the innnedi8te 
boons to be gr2nted by the Le.bour 2nd Democret parties. The 
Natione.1ists were limited in eny 2v,0nue of PlJp11 oach tot.he elect-
ors by the rn=d:.nre o:f the b11dget recently :=: nnouncetl. They 
coul(~ not :-:;o 1)eyonc.'i_ its limits of no ne1N tsxe.tion ?nd few imrned-
hF ,, been done for tl1e best ~' ncl thi= t thcn•e was nothing more to 
,-,._---- '' 
SOMETHING ~OR NOTMl"G 
61. 
WOI'PY .9.bout. Co'.0·te! s cry "Tnrned the Corner-" hr-d been use-
.) 
~ll to s01r the spent pu~lic steadily on. Now 1 }H:. rr.:; V<'/3 8 enough 
energy in thent to Vicent to meke 8 spr·int 1)ut the lfatioff lj_2ts 
were settled down to a sed~te pAce thet left the people rest-
less. 
Though 002 t es we rned the electors agB inst being 
0 beguiled by the impossible promises of' 
he did not fear the DemocrBts nearly as 
1 • 
political novices'' 
~. f/R.c_..R) ) 
much as t¢he Labour 
party. In addition to their traditional championing of the 
workers' ceuse, Labour had made great strides in interesting 
the f'Rrmer. During Budget debates 2 • CoEites admitted the 
attrsctiveness of gu9ranteed prices to p2storal and agricultural 
interests but contended that the high exch2nge re.te was achiev-
ing the same re2ult vii+,hout l,isldng ad6.itional expenditure by 
the Stcte. In Forbes's optnj_on 3. "every sensible m8ntt knew 
quite well thst so m9ny promises Bnd guerantees could never be 
carried out, but the Lsbour Party had en snswer for both of' 
these criticisms. 
Morrell 4 · considers that nothing was more i 1 ernarkeble 
than the attempt of the trade union le8ders at the Ltibour Party 
Conference of 1932, "to find common ground with the working 
f'flrmers". The dep1"eseion viviclly impressecl_ on the irniust:r:•ia1 
11Pres-·"'" IJov 6th 197ir::; .... t_;' 'i. j _ _,,J'f 
"Round 're b 1 e 11 , Vo 1. 24, Tl. 21 3 • 
"Press", Hov. 6th, 1935. 
Morrell, "New Zee.lE·nd", p.18L+. 
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worlrnr end u:ni oni st the vi te 1 plr:. ce of' lJI'imary production in 
',/i th th2t the policy of .:;;usre_nteed 
prices evol veCJ. LBbour' s first pciint was to deny the t var-
ieble overseas prices 8.nd limitations need control the standerd 
of living, in New Zer0l8nd. It could be controlled fJ'om within 
by careful phmning of production and msrketing to alter in 
Bnticipa ti on of fluctuations in demand. 
The provision of guaranteed prices for farm produce 
was only one aspect of a larger view. 1• By control of curr-
ency and credit the Government could fully utilize the J•e2ources 
of the IIB ti on for the benefit of ;:: 11. One of the provisions 
for [~ decent living standsrd was a sts.tutory minimum wege but 
the perty recognised that the quickest route to this ideal was 
throuzh the re-est2blishment of stoble, pPosperous farming and 
the.t the effect of this would p(:;netr2te to 1:iusiness Pnd industry. 
This would ellow the spresding of the nationel income over lPrge 
munbers who et the time of the c2rnp2ign hrd ins.d.equrte incomes. 
This be sic wage and i t_l;:l i)recur·sor , thd gur r·anteed 
price, were the most recent ad.c1i tions to 8 plF: tform which) with 
a few mocflifications, had been expounded by LF~bou:r since 1919. 
Time G l(J 2 veneer of tempero:once had blunted the shEr}Jest points. 
Perh.sps the di:fftcmlties of the p82t four ye<°'rs h::«d cUmr:1ed the 
Party's corn-:'idence in Socislism as 8 pane.ce2 to be 8pplied to 
all economic ills. They omitted to cr-11 for netioni:·lisation 
of land. No more was hesrd of the steeply gr8d~3ted income 
1 • See Policy ste.tement. PF1ul, 11HU1!1F'ni.sir: in Polities"; Appen~ix c, p.166. 
tax, of higher- t:s.x.ing of unirn:ciroved lrnc1 And unearned income. 
this was not t.h1::. "',inie to ri•·ess the: soc;i:c·list push-button in 
the electorate's ear. It would be most offensive to the one 
section of the community most likely to chFmge Labour's fortun-
es and least likely to f~tand for m:itionr0 lie2.tion of lend. 
The strident note hee.rd from 1916 to 1927: "The objective of 
the Party is the sociB.lization of the means of production, 
di stribu 1.ion and exchFJ nge", 
1 • 
was muted to "The objective of 
the Lebour Party is to utilize to the nwximum degree the won-
derful resources of the Dominion". 2• 
It was particulsr>ly necessary in New Zeali=nd for a 
potenti<:<l Government to h2ve suppor·t from the farming community, 
since the country q_uotG had given disproportionate represent-
ation to the rur8l populGtion. It is signific2nt thPt six 
of' the newly elected Lsbo~1r meml)ers in 1935 were farmers and 
at least twelve of the candidetes were f'e.nn§rs - mostly in 
North Islend electorates. This :fa ct or must h2_ ve been re-a ssur-
ing to those to whom a 11 Soci8list" progrF·mrne woulc1 be repellent. 
Also to be found in Nor·th Isl2nd electorates were the 
n1011ete r~t refor·rner·s \iVl10 n1i gl1t believe, fr·om s vs gue gest.t1re i11 
the i.s·bour pl8t:fo1"ITI, th2t sociel crec1i t doctrjnes heel 8 future. 





AppencUx A, T.l. 157. 
Ap1H:;ndix C, l). 165. 
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teblish ;:> rne\tionel credit ~Jutho:rity -NlJof;e duty it vrnuld be to 
provide ,, money service Fufficient to zj_ve e:f:fect to the "vill 
of P8rlioment. This j_ntention di•S not 8larrn the Chr·i stchurch 
"Press", which commented 1 • thL'" t "no reci l dt:f:ference of' pol-
iticel philosophy sepBr2tes the parties. The L8_bour progrsrnme, 
with the possible exception of r1 VFJgue promise to m8ke the Re-
serve Bank into 2_ J?(:iti om 1 credit authority, is not soci8 list tt. 
The most definite proposal lTIRde in this connection was :fop the 
purchase of private sh~res in the ResePve Benk to bPing it under 
StBte Control and to desl similarly with the Mortgage Corpor-
ation,whose CI'eation; Labour• had resisted strongly. 
Apart from the foregoing - guc>:t'f:nteed prices, bE1 sic 
w2ges, credit control - there was little difference between 
Lebour' s progrerl'.rne And th1-:d, of the Democrats, as S:::ivage com-
l)la ined 2• ~,referrtng to thr:: twelve Democrat points, which were 
11 countex•fei ting" LB1Jour poliey. Minhinnick (rn Aucklr~nd 
cc:: rtooni st, f;yrnpatheti c to the lJ<; ti on;:11 Party) mocked 1:1 t both 
of them in his cartoon 3• on Ceptein Chloroform who Dromised 
to promtss more promises thr-n tiny other• cendidt';te. 
A2 the le2_ders spoke only in genereli ti es, 8 ny sirn-
. 1 ... i~::n·1 r. i es in their poltcies were only su~erfici2l • They might 
be~in st the s~1rne point, bu-+; went in OPTiosite directions. 
1. "Press", October 30+.h, 19_:::,5. 
2. 11 :-Ier2lcJ 11 , October 7th, 1935. ,See 8 lso A:9ri1c;rn:Hx B :f'o:e 
policy stetements. 
3. "Hew 2•38.Jsnd HeI'Rlc1 11 , October- Sth, 1935. 
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Eci.ch plEtn to encour~:ige industry, but where the LBbour 
poli ticisns were prepa.1~ing to impose ;::;hort er woridng hours, 
minimum we.ge levels and compulsory unionism (to restore the 
power o:f the Arbitration Court), the Dt::;mocrs.ts emphasized the 
desi r0.bi li ty of "lai ssez-f'B ire", re joj c ing th8 t. already there 
vms relief from compu1t-;01~y a1~bi tration. 
It wes obvious th::'it, i:f not in policy, then in in-
tention, the two p8rt~es were &s opposite 88 ris;ht from left. 
thciy exchAnged ~lows. The left could see little difference 
_/ ., 1. Brr-:nd·. 
int er est. 
1. '".i:vening Po~~t", Ser-11".c:mber '.29th, 1035. 
2. 11 E.r'..H.", Septenfber 25t.11, 1;:35. 
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R8tc~.nEt ca ndid[1.t e, ms de clP ims for sl.i.:ppor·t on the strength of 
the work he hF1 6. done in com1ection with the Ngsitshu clPims. 
11He SPid he hPcd discovered on the books of +,he Nt=,tive L8nd 
Gou.rt thousends bl' l10unds in unclnimed surn:=.:; due to MRoris 
througho1x1·. the Southern Mt:i OJ'i elect ore t e. 11 1 • From the 
comments 011 ~::ir.1plP.use 811\l warmth of tone r~t his meetings, it 
a:ppee.rs t:rv~t this was the wfiy to the !;1!:.o:d elector's heart, 
\/hen CoBtes BppeFn•ed in his O'Nn electornte for the 
12 et ti me before Iv:aori poll i. ng,_ he was .zj. ven clcimorous a ssur-
EL'.:.ces of su;1port for Hgnt.a, their own Nc=d~ion.tilist csndi.dnte, ;oncl 
fc::.n' Te Torno, t.he lTEJtion~:list in \iestern Er,ori. They prom-
lsec1 2 " to send u1ec.:s::iges ur;;ing th: t Te Torno be retur•ned since 
a ~~bour sup~orter. Th::·t wc.s 6.educecl f'I'O!f1 llis r:"1lisnce 11rith 
J;;.T. Tirilrnter1e, 1vho con:.:;istently vote:) y;ith Lc;bour, though 
These two went on e tour 
LrrJOUI' :.o;y:ir1~)1'.~thies 1:1nd RA tans' s religious fervour they vvonld 
scarcely need to trouble to st2te very definite policjes. 
1. 11 ;_)r'ef;f;" ~ Eovernbe:e 5th, 1935, 
.2. u:r:1")e:3Gu, 1Tc1\renfuer· 21st, ~935'" 
3. 11E. ?.ii.", S0:~it..::.rnlJe1~ 25t;.1li 1935. 
r-, 
0 {. 
recormnended by the VE1rj.ous Roys 1 commissions on the problem 
of forfeited tribRl lsnds. There were promises Elsa of a 
1
• f 1· . 1 t d d 1 t f th . secret br= llot or 1wor1 e ec ors 8.n - eve opmen o · e1r 
communities e.long pr•ogressi ve lines. 
The~' gr ve only 11% o:f their votes to 
Demo ere ts. Pe11 haps they hs.d noticed thrit the promise of 
com:p(::nseti on me de in Octo1)er 1w s not included in budget allo-
est ions O'.Jtlined by Hislop 011 NovemrJer 21st. From the part;;,r' s 
point of view, the; E20J~i vote was not im[1o:rte.nt so tJu=t it was 
etronzer el ectorr1 te s. 
The section 
on ttRece Bq_unlity" 2" prorni se(1 th,_c; L>ori 
the ver·y +hinzr:: sbout whicJ.1 he cUz~ not m;:-ke compJ.::=1ints - b•i.t 
( -. ' , -l , .Cl .l t::: J.. ·'· t-::: .i 
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ssles end crippling interest r8tes, there were the customary 
attecks on c::i.pi t.~list repr•ession of the toilers. Finally ell 
we.r debts 2rcd imperi2.l e.A'Penses wer(:; l'epudin.ted. 
Lik(:; other sme 11 gr·oups, the Corm1mni st s tJ:>i ed to gs.in 
a little reflected glory/ by association wiih one of the large 
+. par ,1es. In the last six months .of 1935 the Connnunists 
1 • 8ppr·oe.ohed Lrj bour without success. Some of the genuinely 
independent candidates, on the other hcind, were ge .. llec1 by the 
frequency 1·1i th which their qL1estioners a s~rnd where their s;yrn-
pnthi es 1r.ronld lie in s no-confidenee motion. Some Independ-
ents tried to avoid giving an answer. Sir AlexBntler Herdman 
2. 
tlJrc 1; if t=:leetr.;·" ht; would vote t,,_ put the Government 
out, of offlce cil1cl .,·on1cl vote to keeT) L· lJoUl' Ollt of' off'ice.. 
There co'-..1lc1 ·1:;e no (::ouj>t where he stood. 
Even Hislop st~ted 
B ' 3. (;I1C 118 8 • 
1. G1_1~p~~EL }_:\.23,, 
2. 11 F. ''..~i. 11 7 October 'lr::t, 1935. 
3. 11 Pr-e:ss 1', Eov•:jmber Stl;., -19j5. 
ently with one of the mB jor parties. Undisciplined by party 
whips, he was little more than a debater in the House, and the 
elector's vote was more or less wasted. 
The feverish tension of the 18 st -f:ew days befox•e 
election~ concentrated s.ttention on the essentie.ls in policy. 
This eppesrs clearly in the election eve broadcasts by the 
leaders of' the three lRrgest parties. Broadcasting had been 
banned thJ'oughout the campaign but Forbes, Coates, 88vf;ge and 
Hi slop each ,gave s f:',hort address on Eonday, November 25th, 2 s 
Maori voting took place on the following day Rn& Europe9n on 
the 27th. These s.dctresses hnd to touch on their opponent-'s 
weakee.t points c nd vri thout any :;::ireliwi nsr·i es re2.ch the esentials 
of each party policy. They inrlicete, too, the differing at-
ti tudes of the le:::ders towards cs,m::;,1~" i 2:Eing by the:i r choice of 
Forbes did not mention the DemocratB. He urged 2.ll 
elect ors to vote but warned them s g~' inst t'-1 reat eni ng "sound 
fins.nee" by voting for Le.l)our v.rho o:f:ferec1 only ">:n orgy of rash 




11Jr1Jcc:; - guc:l'r-:uteed :!rices :'i_H-,_ l·~;= tion: 1 r:;r_1llt.Tc•l of' c-arr·ency 2nd 
credit .• 
. " increaseCL 
1-. "EveniEg Posit11 , IToveniber· 26th~ 1935. 
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the volume of currency. 
The Nationslists' theme was thet the CoBlition had 
done its best 2nd would continue the good work of reconstr-uction. 
They were the only speakers who could h?ve reviewed. their period 
of office with.a recite.l of achievements and wise decisions; 
but they had the misfortune not to be able to show nearly as 
much reconstruction as there he.d been de.struction of the prev-
iously comforteble New Zealand standerd of living. It was 
\Viser not to rr:xnind the listeners of the lX' st but to urge them 
to eppreciete ths.t recovery mu.st not be endangered by exrieri-
mi:;nts likely to get out of control. 
:Like Fo~r'bes, the Lebom.~ J.er-:o.er i:{nored the Den10c:r«::ots. 
Be ~p9e?led to electors to vote for L2bour can0idqtes who would 
e;i ve t>c ':,;hols of thetr ~~irnc: tci c:~1Jolishing pover·ty. His only 
r·eference to ot1ie1•s was the remark th8t the 11 diE;credited" 
were not to be trusted with the responsibility of Goverrunent 
but h1:; pledt:;ed his pe rty to tr·y 11 to put ri_zht the secrifices 
to disp2rage the Co0lition, blBming thffin ror pest tragedies. 
Savege could afford to isnore their progrem~e. 
vvjJh,ly held, thet Lebour vras the only 2lternntive to the Ne.tion-
slists. 
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ied that the Nationalists would be lucky to retain 20 seats and 
that his own party;which "stood for true freedom'~ would win 
more seats than either of the two "Socialist" parties. He 
ended by reiterating his offer of a. "sane and sound policy". 
After two months of' constant campaigning by all 
parties, a year of emanations from the Democr8t s, four years 
of CoGlition rule and m8ny yecirs o:f unflagging L8l)our activit-
ies, the public must hs.ve suf':fered confusion from the em1xn•ras·s-
ment of riches from v,rhich to choose in November. ProbG.bly 
they had least idea of what to expect from the Government as its 
generr1 l trend of persue.sion was 11Let us ;so on doing the best 
we c2n11 • No 2udden ch2nge of policy h2d been offered and only 
cButious e.cti on could be expected. 
t rel'1i st. 
Th0 gtti tuc1E: to L2bour wci.e pr·obebly more often ex-
Eager expectation of imrnedirc te boons we 8 bsl,,nced. 
oy dread of the finsnciBl blows to be dee:ilt to ell ebove the 
low w2,ge-ear·ners s.nd unionists. Those people would be the 
convinced ones, not to be vrnE•.ned aw2,y from their B-.llegiances. 
For eve1,y one of these, there must h::;ve been two mo1,e who we:re 
perpl exec1 with the choice before therr1 ~-·nd who would feel that 
nothing could be vvorse thsn the policy the t hAct governed U1e 
lP t e Cf' bi net so that J_,aoou:e coulD only be 3.11 in12_1rovem1:::nt.. 
It VJe,2 less li}rnly thi::t they 'Nould do much dr:-m:-:<ge th;::,n thi::,t 
they could clo mor·e sood. 
The cont e11-S' ous rne<:"- sures hs.d 81.r•eady won. admirers: 
72. 
the dairy farmers generally were interested in any scheme 
like guaranteed prices which could protect them from :further 
setbacks in preference to the raising of' the exchange which 
disaster had forced out after the worst had been encountered. 
There was no need to work hard to win murnbers to accept some 
change in credit control. Major Douglas had pre-pared the 
path along which meny were to travel towards the Labour pro-
gramme. The rest of the proposals offered by both Labour 
and Democrats were similar enough to give rise to the suspic-
ion that the Democrats had resorted to borrowing ideas. 
The sympathy was with the first comers. Labour did not have 
to attract the business mnn since city electorates were already 
theirs, so they did not make the blunder of plAnning to lower 
the exehange rate as did the Democrat policy. 
In the vital matter of attracting the farming vote, 
the LBbour Policy had just sufficient "pull" to win the tri-
angular tug-of-war while the Democrats were sapping the Gov-
ernment's strength. 
73. 
PROPOGAI'IDA AND PUBLICITY. 
The high-powered political salesmanship introduced 
into New Zealand election campaigning by Davy was again in evi-
/ 
dence in 1935, applied not only by him but also by the ~~tional 
1Parties. They had been apt pupils, but the new techniques 
increased their problems of organisation and f'inance. Where 
once it had been possible to fight an election on as little as 
ten shillings, 1• a candidate could not now reduce it to much 
less than £50. 2• What one party did, the others were forced to 
do also. The greatest expenditure seems to have gone into 
travelling expenses f'or the leaders' tours, and f'or political 
literature, whether in newspapers or in pamphlets for household 
distribution. Unfortunately, because of the fourteen+years 
that have elapsed since the election, none of the Nationalist 
or Democrat propaganda material, except what may be seen in 
newspapers, is available for comparison. There does, however, 
seem to be an indication that the National Party spent the most 
3. 
on propaganda in newspapers. 
1. Mr. Dell, (in a letter to the writer) quoted the case of 
F.R. Cooke who paid 10/- in 1928 for, 2 calico signs 
which were hung on fences at the corner where he was 
going to speak. Each evening one of his committee men 
rang a bell for five minutes to attract a crowd. 
2. The Labour Head Of':f'ice appealed for £5,000 in 1935 to 
contest 70 electorates. This represents about £70 
for each electorate. 
3. There is the possibility that newspaper publishers may 
have contributed space to the National Party~which 
they supported, so that actual expenditure might not 
have been great. 
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They needed no one to tell them they were in a dangerous posit-
ion. Even the change to a new name could not hold the waver-
ers without some intensive work, so they kept up a steady cBJill-
paign of advertising in the newspapers. These advertising 
blocks were lavishly and skilfilly designe<:!-, some covering 
whole pages. Throughout November, they appeared in all the 
city dailies and in some of the country weeklies. 
Especially were the opportunities of the last week 
exploited. In the seven issues of the Christchurch "Presstt 
between Tuesday, November 19th and th~ following Tuesday - the 
day before the elections - there were six National Party ad-
vertisements averaging 154 sq. ins. to two Labour Party blocks 
averaging 74 sq. ins. There was fairly even distribution be-
tween attacks on the opponent's candidates and policies/ and 
publicity for their own platform and candidates. The most 
vivid of the Nationalist designs showed a rat trap bai'fred with 
the cheese of Guaranteed Prices. The caption - A TRAP FOR 
THE VOTER - warned rural electors not to be beguiled. Other 
topics were: the situation in British politics 1 • where there 
was A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE NATIONAL GOOD - New Zealanders 
were urged to follow Britain's lead; the safety of savings was 
illustrated by the danger of letting a Labour Government, as in 
New South Wales in 1931, manage a savings bank. "Don't let it 
happen here! 11 said the National Party. 
1. Mr. Baldwin's photograph headed this National Party ad-
vertisement. This, and others mentioned, were seen 
at the Wellington office of Charles Haines Advertising 
Ltd. 
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Though there were many comments that Democrat can-
didates were to be treated as a joke, more serious attention 
was given to Hislop in a National advertisement which was 
headed: STARTLING CONFESSION! 
DEMOCRAT LEADER TOO BUSY FOR POL1TICS. 
lie was quoted as saying that ttThe Mayor of this city has far too 
many demands upon his time and mental and physical energy to be 
able to embark upon other public work". 
Both National and Labour propagandists made use of 
a statement made as long since as 1909 by Sir Joseph Ward that 
the 11 Independent is of no use to anybody". 1 • Labour repeated 
it also in a handbill. 2" But more than two could play at 
this game. Duff, Independent candidate for Hurunui, retal-
iated in the "North Canterbury Gazettett, which he edited. He 
atta~ked Forbes by quoting his own remark in an election speech 
in 1928, when he said "God help New Zealand if' it votes again 
for Coa tes 11 • 3. 
Advertisements about individual candidates naturally 
dealt with their abilities and worthiness for election. A 
rash of these laudatory notices appeared in the last week of 
the campaign. Friday's issue (Nov. 22nd.) of the "Dominion" 
had twenty-two personal advertisements, 4· 13 ror Nationalists, 
1. SeeP.D. Vol. 148, p.1,463. 
2. see Appendix c. I. 
3. Quoted from "North Canterbury Gazette",. by 11 Standard 11 , 
November 20th, 1935. 
4. see Appendix C II f'or an exrunple. 
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4 for Democrats, 5 for Independents but none for Labour can-
didates. The usual device adopted by them and others short 
of funds was the reproduction of a photograph accompanying 
notice of an address. 
Probably the personal information given by candidates 
attached to a party was never as valuable a lure as descript-
ions of policy or past performanee. It was always notice-
able in the attitude of an audience towards an Independent that 
they only wanted to hear his policy expounded, after they had 
established whether he was wi_th or against their chosen party. 
Then they would heckle happily or approve his points according 
to their political convictions. The Independent relied more 
upon his personality than most other candidates. A candidate 
could generally expect to be returned or defeated more upon 
the policy he stood for than any personal qualities and for this 
reason money was used to better advantage if spent on exposit-
ions of programmes. 
It was probably not a good move for the Nationalists 
to urge people to remember that "FACTS AND FIGURES COUNT MORE 
'rHAN PROMISES" when Labour could turn on them with ttREMEMBER 
THE CUTS0 1 • It was of little use for the Nationalists to 
quote statistics about increased production to a public which 
knew little about· finance and could as well believe Labour's 
use of :figures. They quoted 2• Budgetary :figures o:f 1935 
1. See sample sheet Appendix c, III. 
2. See sheet IV in Appendix c. 
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showing increasing farm production between 1928 and 1933 to 
indict .,the Coalition for being so "niggardly" while "Providence 
was most generous". What they did not remind the people was 
that the increased production did not mean increased wealth in 
the country, because of the lowered prices ~or rarm produce 
and reduction of the Government's sources of taxes. 
The National party could not stir feelings of thank-
fulness by recitals of reduced Public Debt, increased bank de-
posits or greater tourist traffic when many people had no motor-
cars or Savings Banks accounts. On the other hand, practically 
every elector would have had some unhappy experience which Labour 
candidates could call to mind for them in their ceaseless stirr-
ing among the ashes of the depression. 
Neither side hesitated to take an advantage of the 
other, unfair or not. The firecracker of Savings Bank depos-
its set going a whole train of explosions from Labour, which 
attacked the commercial banks as a "gang of bushrangers" 1 • in 
retaliation for the Nationalists' allegations. In New South 
Wales in 1931, the Labour Government's handling of the financial 
crisis destroyed the people's confidence in the Saving9 s Bank. 
The consequent run on the Bank resulted in its closing the 
doors. This incident was recalled by Forbes, ~ho declared 
that a Labour Government would menace the savings of the people 
and involve the control of the banking machinery of the Domin-
2. ion. The Associated Banks of. New Zealand, not liking 
1. Quoted by Forbes in the "Press", November 9th, 1935. 
2. ibid~, ·N0vember--9th, 1935• 
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Savage's reference to bushrangers, joined in with large illus-
trated advertisements of the New South Wales crisis. 1. 
Savage protested against these 0 large, unfair and 
lying advertisements", 2 · misrepresenting Labour's policy and 
resentfully criticised the ]3an.k·Lg·, coming out openly into pol-
itics to frighten the public. Labour indi~nation was voiced 
on the platform, in letters to the newspapers and in the "Stand-
ard", which on November 20th made reference to posters being 
prepared to fight the Nationalists' propaganda. However 
bank advertisements continued to appear, partly in self-defence -
0 Banks d:o not reap a harvest f'rom financial bad times" - but 
also to attack, "Lorq. Snowden's warning - banks must be free from 
political control". 3. 
Both Labour and National leaders, however, prided 
themselves on their sense of fair play. Before the session 
ended, Savage promised that he would not use personalities in 
the campaign and he was sure that the other side would not 
ttstoop to conquer". 4. Yet one of leaflets widely distribut-
ed by Labour was undoubtedly intended as a reflection upon 
Coates, who was considered to have used national funds for ex-
~essi ve grants in his own electorate. 5. 
1. The first Associated Banks advertisement appeared in uPress 11 
on November 5th, 1935 • 
. 2. "Press", November 8th, 1935. 
3. Ibid., November 23rd, 1935. 
4. Ibid., October 22nd, 1935· 
5. See copy in Appendix C, V. 
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Even less than the Labour attacks, did the National-
ists like Democrat charges of trickery in the public accounting 
system, made possible by their ambiguous interpretations of 
the Auditor-General's report on teehnical difficulties. More 
justifiable was the Democrat complaint that public money had 
been used to prod~ce a 20 page booklet on the ~overnment's 
housing scheme, which was still only a project and not yet 
autharized by legislation, but which could nevertheless wfu~ sup-
port for the National policy. 
The Labour Party lost no opportunity to attack the 
Democrats, making effective use of the organiser's fluctuations 
of political allegiance. Commenting that Davy had adhered to 
United and Reform in turn, then to their Coalition before he 
took up his latest proteges, the ttStandard 11 1 · reviewed "the 
Promises of' Davy" comparing them with "The Performance of Davytt 
and concluding that as little could be expected from the Demo-
crats as the country had had from the Coalition. 
It was mentioned earlier that the Labour Party made 
only infrequent use of newspaper advertisements in the pro-
Government papers. This was partly due to the lack of money 
and partly to the development of their own weekly, the "New 
r) 
Zealand Worker" ~· When the paper was issued as the 11 Standard11 
after October 9th, 1935, it became a valuable asset to the 
1. October 30th, 1935. 
2. The "Worker" had a circulation of about 10,000 and the 
"Standard.", of' about 15,000 in November, 1935, according 
to 111. J. Wi1son, editor of' the "Standard.'! in a letter to 
the writer, 23-2-49. " 
80. 
Labour Party in their election campaign. A number of addit-
ional features e.g. magazine features and illustrations, made 
it more popular. Both newspapers had a Dominion-wide cover-
age, most sales being in the cities. 
To ensure that every corner of each electorate was 
reached by election literature, the Head Office arranged to 
issue material at a nominal charge to all Labour candidates. 
For many years it had been the practice of the Labour Party's 
National off'ice to prepare pamphlets sold at a penny or two-
pence. Re-issues were now prepared and new subjects added. 
In 1935 the most popular one was Nash's 0 Guaranteed Prices" 1• 
The others were: The Case for Labour: M.J. Savage. 
Four Years of Failure: J.A. Lee. 
The Conquest of Depression: J. Roberts. 
A National Heal th Service: Dr. D. G. McMillan. 
Commonsense of the Money Question: H.G.R.Mason. 
and the Manifesto "Labour has a Plan''• 
Most of the printed pamphlets were ready in October, 
but were not used as expected. 2. Letters, urging the use of 
them, were sent out to·candidates as late as November 12th. 
A circular dealing with candidates'~.Jquestions and replies and 
prepared by the Head Office executive was distributed also to 
all candidates. 
ganda. 
Cartoons were a constant part of the campaign propa-
In most of the newspapers these were pro-National 
1. 51,000 of Nash's, 30,000 of Savage's and about 200,000 
other pamphlets end leaflets were distributed. See 
Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1936. 
2. A copy of such a lette~ dated 12-11-35, was seen at the 
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except that the Communist and Labour Parties were able to present 
their side of the picture in the "Workers' Weekly" 1' and the 
"Standard" ~espectively. The periodical _0 Tomorrowtt, which 
had Socialist sympathies, also caricatured the Nationalists and 
Democrats, but it could reach very few in cornpariso.n with the 
cheaper newspapers. The pro+Government cartoons had the 
advantage of being more artistic and of having a wider audience. 
They still shared the defect of exaggeration which destroys 
the cartoon's power of conversion. From the nature of the 
cartoon which raises a laugh, it is not a weapon. It enter-
tains friend and foe alike and its spirit of mockery may be 
turned against both. 
Among the records of election material kept by the 
Labour Party was a sill.de used for advertising in picture theatres. 
No doubt other parties must have made use of this method. It 
would have the advantage of keeping up contact with the elect-
orate in areas not constantly served by election campaigns. 
It would also reach some who might otherwise ignore political 
propaganda, and as a temporary measure had perhaps more value 
than the gramophone technique tried by. the Democrats. Record-
ings of Hislop's recital of the platform were played in shop-
windows in certain small towns not included in his itinerary, 
e.g. Rotorua and Cambridge. 1• No doubt, by this method, a 
few more people were persuaded to listen to the Democrat policy 
1. Information supplied by Davy in an interview with 
the writer. 
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than could have been reached if they had been left to read, or 
ignore, the policy statements in the newspapers. Other can-
didates, besides Hislop, used the records, playing them at 
election addresses, familiarising electors with the leader's 
voice and helping to build up a national reputation for him. 
Hislop had an. advantage, in that~ not being.a Member 
of Parliament, he could begin touring the country while the other 
leaders:-rwere still hobbled to Wellington. There was, however, 
little advantage for him in having everywhere hostile c·onnnent-
aries from pro-National. newspapers. He had head-winds all 
the way. Even the Communists were better served, for the 
"Workers' Weeklyu did reach a certain part of the city popul-
a tions. But no newspaper was allied to the Democrat cause, 
though for a time the 0 Evening Post0 showed a mild interest 
in the new party; no popular cartoonist championed them; His-
lop was al.ways the upstart and Davy the wicked magician. 
Much had been expected of Davy's propaganda. He was 
well-known for catchy slogans. Savage recalled 1• such 
phrases as: ttKeep in step with the Motherlandtt, and "Keep your 
man in his job" or 0 coats of'f with Coates"-, - the work of 'the 
"master mind" now behind the Democrats. Davy was looked upon 
as a bogey-man, more to be feared than his employers, the Demo-
crat Party. However, the shadow was larger than reality. 
The Organiser did not make use of newspapers for the 
1. uEvening Post 0 , October 3rd, 1935. 
all-important policy statements. Individual candidates did, 
and other forms of publicity were not neglected but there was 
no sign 1• of nation-wide advertisements as used by National 
and Labour Parties. References to propaganda materials make 
it clear that the Democrats fought the election on paper as 
well as by speeches but the neglect of newspaper advertising was 
a real lapse. 
It would not seem to be lack of funds which could 
account for this. Money flowed freely into other channels. 
To assist in recruiting candidates, the national organiser 
1 t t 2. assured them that they wou d no be pu to a penny of expense 
and would be provided with a handbook to help in answering 
electors' questions. 
Some. aspects of general publicity arrangements were 
mentioned during the campaign. Copies of a pamphlet on Maori 
policy - the work pf a special committee - were circulated in 
Maori constituencies according to Davy 3. At an election 
address in Manuks.u, another Democrat publication was mentioned 
by an interjector. He referred 4. to a statement printed 
in a publication 11 issued in all the electorates". 
1. In the newspapers searched by the writer viz. the "Presstt 
Christchurch, the N. Z.H. ", the "Evening Post", the 0 Dominion· 
and the "Southland. Times". 
2. This statement was seen in the handbook. Davy remarked to 
the writer that the candidates "all put their ha.nds out for 
their election expenses 0 • This was in reply to a query 
whether the possession of private means was taken into con-
sideration when selecting candidates. He said it made 
no difference. 
3. "Evening Post", October 6th, 1935. 
4. 11 New Zealand Herald", November 1st, 1935. 
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One form of cheap publicity enjoyed to a considerable 
extent by the Labour and National Parties was the increasing 
number of letters championing parties; in November issues of 
newspapers. Even this propagand~i was denied to Democrats, 
who were seldom made the subject of correspondence. Indeed, 
any partiality expressed for them was usually of a rather grudg-
ing kind from correspondents who were afraid to trust themselves 
to the unknown evils of Socialist policies, yet were dissatis-
fied with the Government and so turned to the Democrats as the 
least of thr.ee evils. 
Much use was made of the phrase "sick of the Govern-
ment" in speeches and writings. The Coalition was probably 
defeated before it began fighting. The people were genuinely 
seeking for some one to lead them out of their perplexities, 
but it was not to be Hislop. Perhaps if there had been more 
time for the nation to begin to accept him as a familiar figure 
there might have been a different result. A party of person-
able candidates, with a few· neat phrases summing up a moderate 
policy, should have had a chance to beat Labour for some of the 
shaky Government seats. But time was against the new party. 
A year had been lost in solving intetval difficulties, when it 
would have been better spent in tours of the country by two or 
three of the leading lights of the party. 
Although broadcast speeches would have reached a very 
large number of electors (without the hazard of heckling) use 
of the radio stations was not permitted to any candidates except 
for the f'nal addresses by the leaders of the major parties. 
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There was no Minister of Broadcasting then, the 
Natione.l Broadcasting Service being controlled by a board, which 
made the decision to ban election speeches. This rule ex-
tended not only to "A" or Government stations but also to ttB" 
or commercial ones. The Auckland B station (1.Z.B.) in 1935 
was directed by a popular broadcaster, the Rev. c.G. Scrimgeour
1 
who apparently under cover of philosophical ~emarks in his 
Sunday talks to "the man in the street" had infringed the no-
poli tics stipulation, showing partiality for monetary reform-
ers ani Auckland Labour candidates. He claimed that his ref-
erences to politics were only "in the broade:st~.sense •••• appeal-
ing to people to put aside personalities". 1 • Nevertheless, 
he angered numbers of people from whom he had many letters and 
anonymous messages. This had been going on for some time 
but the "Worker"· 2• attributes his imrnuni ty from legal action 
to the weight of public opinion favouring his broadcasts. 
It is very likely that the Government would belneluct-
ant to authorize a move which would add to their unpopularity. 
Yet they did not escape being implicated in the disturbance on 
November 24th when the station's "Friendly Roadu broadcast was 
jammed. There was a suggestion that Post and Telegraph offic-
ers were responsible, bringing from Coates the reply 3• that 
the interference 11 is either a ~hildish rag or a.n unscrupulous 
1. "Evening Post", November 25th, 1935. 
2. "New Zealand Worker", September 25th, 1935. 
3. "Evening Post", November· 25th, 1935· 
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attempt to make political capital by throwing suspicion on the 
Government". He reminded readers that he had already warned 
them to be on guard against last minute trickery. 
There is no doubt in politics, at least, that "any 
cat in the twilight's grey.!!· The Nationalists had recently 
wrung from Savage the accusation of "unscrupulous misquotation ••• 
to stampede the electorstt, 1 • in connection with an incautious 
remark by Munro (Dun. West), who used the phrase "go out and 
smash things". If the Labour Party was elected to power it 
would be essential, for the success of their policy, to be able 
to control industry even if industrialists were not co-opera.t-
i ve. 11 If we cannot carr;yJ out our policy", said Munro, ttwe will 
go to the electors and get a mandate, and if we can't do it then, 
the only thing to do will be to go out and smash thingst'. 2. 
Munro denied the accuracy of the Press reports, ex-
plaining that the smashing would be done by the people, not by 
the political Labour Party. Whatever he meant, there was a 
sting in the tail of Savage's deeence of him. He could not 
imagine Munro to be capable of making the misleading statement 
attributed to him. This type of last-minute propaganda must 
have been considered an unexpected piece of good luck by the 
Nationalists as there was quite a battery of abuse about a party 
that was determined to "go out and smash things", the final 
rounds being firedl by Coates in his broadcast address on Monday, 
25th. 
1. ttpress", Christchurch, November 25th, 1935. 
2. ibid., November 22nd, 1935. 
If these trivial incidents could do so much to sway 
opinion at the last minute,it seems that the more serious issues 
of policy and past performance had less influence than they 
ought to have had. Were the New Zealand people so undecided 
that any sensation could persuade them anew?. In any nation 
there are those for whom emotional appeal has more force than 
reasonable argument and in the greatest number of electors there 
is insufficient understanding of the issues involved~ to know 
when they are being misle~ ·so that a little trickery is a use-
ful thing. The politician may excuse his half-truths and am-
biguities since, if he troubled to make complete explanations 
of the economic issues or the political necessities, most aud-
iences could remember only the simplest portions. The petty 
platitudes can evoke more agreement than a logical survey. 
The elector most to be feared is he who makes up his 
mind from day to day, never satisfied with explanations given, 
never sure that there may not be just as much good in the other 
side. The election results show that there were large numbers 
of voters whose allegiances were not fixed. The candidates 
had already sensed it by the end of the campaign and naturally 
seized each opportunity to anchor the floating vote. 
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FORECASTS AND ESTIMATES. 
Although speculation about the results of the elect-
ion vari'8> greatly, no one predicted __§l.le1f a swing of the pen-
,_..., . 
dulum violent enough to bring Labour into power with fifty-
three seats out of eighty. It was generally recognised that 
the political situation was very fluid. Morrell remarked 
that "it was clear that a political retorientation was in pro-
gress but it was not clear what the new diLrection would be. 01 • 
There were no surveys of public opinion by the 
"Gallup poll" technique. Speeches and writings of the times 
indicated that sn increased vote sgeinst the Government was 
inevitable but a cautious tone pervaded most estimates. 
. / .. ~,\ 
Those who tried to :Leed, the f'luttering pulse of the populace 
were generally deceived in diagnosis. There were groups 
whose loyalty was unswerving but many more were quick to re-
spond to personalities at election meetings but would be 
equally quickly inconstant in private debate. The corres-
pondence columns of newspapers show that many were still seek-
ing enlightenment and trying to make up their minds in the 
last week before November 27th. 
LBbour underestimated their advance though all were 
certain thet there would be increases in their numbers. Not 
even the most pessimistic Government would have believed tha.t 
Cr:i rr' s prophecy of "the biggest political landslide in the his-
tory of' the Dominion" 2• would be fulfilled. At worst they 
1. w. P. Morrell in an article in the "Contemporary Review11 , 
March, 1936. 
2. Rev. C.L. Carr, (Lr::bour M. P.) in debate as r~ported in 
P.D. Vol. 242, p.312. 
could visualize being reduced to a minority Government, depend-
ent on a handful o~ Democrats and Independents. It was 
common for the m~nbr groups of candidates to predict their 
successes bravely as part of the technique of campaigning. 
The defensive tone of both National candidates and 
their supporting newspapers and journals warred against the 
occasional hearty pronouncement ·• W.P. Endean, Government 
member :for Parnell,· considered that the people were goigg to 
put in "the same stable government tt 1 • as be:fore, refusing tb. 
admit the possibility suggested to him that New Zealand was 
"at the crossroads ... Nevertheless, there was no lack of 
warning from other judges of the situation/ that there was a 
I 
great deal of opposition to the Government waiting to be ex-
pressed on November 29th. In 1934, shortly after the aia'llnOunce-
ment of a new Democrat party, the ttEvening Post" spoke of the 
need to settle the question of the Coalition's becoming one 
party for the election. ttThe Coalition has lost. ground and 
should hasten to re-establish itself". 2• The commentator 
claimed that there was a solid body of opinion which woy.ld sup-
port ttso-called unpopular policies provided that they could be 
framed efficiently and fairly 0 • 
The advent of the Democrat party in September and in 




ttlvening Post", Wellington, October 18, 1934. 
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National Political Federation began a year-long battle for 
election. Just as each party or candidate made political 
use of fear and sombre warning1 or cheerful hope as new devel-
r 
opments dictated, so they themselves suffered alternation be-
tween optimism and doubt. Any comforting auguries were hail-
ed with relief - but these were not easy to find. Not since 
1925 had there been a party sufficiently satisfactory to the 
people to be returned to power with a majority of votes. 
Earlier depressions in 1922f 1909 e.nd the 1880' s had been foll-
owed by rejection of the party in power. It did not necessar-
ily follow that Nationalists would automatically be knocked by 
the .swing_ of the pendulum since they had had longer in which 
to repair the damage to their defences. But as if it was not 
enough to have a multiplicity of parties again with the Demo-
crats taking the third place, as well as having the gloom of' 
depression still shadowing the recovery efforts, there was also 
no better fare to offer than the mixture of the last few un-
appetising financial gruels, slightly sweetened while Labour 
offered rich-sounding, new recipes. 
If closer inspection was made of the changes in the 
basis of Labour's support in the previous decade the National 
Party must have fonseen that the advances made by Labour in 
rural areas would continue. Following the 1921 depression 
five of the seventeen elected members were from wholly or main-
ly rural electorates, 1• but in 1925 there was a reversion to 
the normal political allegiance with rising export prices, when 
1. Appendix to P.D., 1922, H.33. 
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1 • 
four of those five seats were losto The exception was 
Buller, which was not wholly rural in that its electors in-
eluded many miners - always staunch unionists. Moreover the 
I 
Labour candidate there was H.Eo Ho~land, the ~arty leader, and 
an outstanding f'igure amllmg politicians. 
The election of 1928 was preceded by poor prices 
overseas for dairy products. Labour again advanced, gaining 
three rural seats and one partly rural, in addition to three 
city seats.. Only one of t.he rural seats was lost three years 
2. l later. These vural gains were neg igible beside the much 
greater success in city areas and might have been expected to 
continue in threes and fours but not to be quadrupled~as happ-
ened in 1935., 
BY-ELECTIONS~ 
There was no warning of the coming reversals in any 
of the by-elections between 1931 and 1935e There were only 
four of these; two in the one constituency, Lyttelton,. Ea.ch 
was decided more by the personality of the leading candidate than 
by the policy of the party he representede 
The first was in Motueka in 1932. The previous 
representative, G.C. Black,held the seat against the candidature 
7. 
of K.J. Holyoake with a majority of only 500. ~ 0 Black's 
death left Holyoake (Coale) as the only well~known figure to 
1,. ibid., 1926, Ho33o 
2. ibid., 1932=3, Ho33e 
3 o 0 Press", November 27th, 19350 
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contest the election against P.O. Webb (Labo) and the Hone R~ 
McKenzie (Lib.) Webb came. from Westland to contest the seat. 
He was a formidable oppenent, being an experiL~nced speaker and 
a well-known unionist, but he was too aggressive compared with 
the more acceptable personality of Holyoake. Though the 
latter won on a minority vote owing to the three-cornered con-
test, his was the person and policy most acceptable to the 
farming majority. The election could offer no pointer to 
the sweeping changes to follow. 
In the following year the death of Holland of Buller 
gave Webb the chance to cont.est an election nearer home. 
Holland had been opposed by a Gove~nment candidate, J .. Menzies, 
but only one Independent Liberal stood- against Webb. Having 
no party backing and being a stranger from Hawkes Bay 10 H.O. 
Simson could not be expected to defeat Webb, who won easilye 2• 
Webb met with some opposition from mining officials 
but they were not strong enough to put up a candidate of their 
own against him .. He does not seem to have been popular with 
-z 
the rank and file of the Miners' Union, Je although they did 
stay away from the meetings organised by the mining officials 
in protest against the selection of Webb as a candidate .. 
This may have been due pa,tly to apathy towards politics be-
tween general elections but more likely to Labour sympathies 
which would not be alienated even by a unsuitable candidate .. 
1.. ttPresstt, October 16th, 1933 .. 
2o Webb, 4,799 votes, Simson 2,249e ibid. ~ovember 23rd 1933. 
3. ibid. November 22nd, 1933. 
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It is diff'icult to understand why no Government flan= 
didate was f'ound. Certainly there was no organisation for 
the Coalition able to swing quickly into action for an unex-
pected by=election. The large vote for the· Independent 
suggests that the anti-Labour vote might have been stronger 
had th~re been a Government candidate whose stronger backing 
would have attracted many more of the shifting votes than a 
non=party man could expect to doo Very many electors did 
not go to the polls ie so the Buller by-election could not be 
cailed a mandate to Labour and the Government could hope to do 
better there against Webb than had been pos~ible against Holland. 
A more decisive mandate was given to the Mccombs 
family, each election strengthening their hold on the Lyttelton 
electorate. In 1931 J. Mccombs, a veteran Labour politician, 
only with difficulty retained his seat against F. Freeman (Coalo) 
having only 32 votes to sparee Two years later Mrs. E. Mccombs 
defeated Freeman with a majority of 2, 669. The ebbing of 
Freeman's pre~iously strong following would be due principally 
to discontinue with the Government, then deep in depression 
disputes. Mrs. Mccombs could claim it also a personal triumph. 
She had been her. husb13-nd' s interested helperr had contest.ed an 
election on her own account in Christchurch North in 1931 and 
was assured of goodwill in the Lyttelton electorate for her 
1.. Whereas in 1931, 8099 votes were cast, in 1933 there were 
only 5,048. Only 74-71% of the possible votes were 
record_ed compared with 86. 57% in 1931 •. 
From information sup;pli.ed by the Chief Electoral 
Off'icer, Wellington! 
sympathetic work in easing women's diff'iculties during the 
depression. Curiously enough) there was no increased feminine 
voting, the proportion of women's votes being slightly less 
than at the earlier general election. ie 
The third Mccombs (T.H.) owed his ~lection in Jul~, 
1935 even more to the unpopularity of the Coalition. Polii;.ic~ 
ally inexperienced, youthf'ul and unknown, he was opposed by 
M.E. Lyons (Nat.) a Christchurch City Councillor who was well-
known, a lively speaker and forceful personality with a long 
record of public service. National supporters claimed that 
it was his parents' record that won the seat· for the son, but 
Labour sympathieers approved of McCombs's good platform manner 
and his competent arguing. The Socialist journal ttTomorrow0 
noted also that whereas Mccombs had assistance from his party 
leaders• visits to the electorate, Lyons 11p1-.eferred to. conduct 
his -own eampaign°, suggesting that by minimising his connection 
with the Coalition, he was emphasizing his own acceptability 
2 .. 
in pr·ef'erence to tha. t of Coates' or Forbes'. 
The Labour Headquarters found that there was an immed-
iate response to the request for funds for the election. 
11Money eame in from indi vidtlals and organised worke:i;>t? all over 
the Dominion". 3a It was considered,· th~, that Labour would 
have no dif:fillculty at the November election in keeping all those 
1 Q ibid.· 
2a 0 Tomorrow", July 31, 1935· 
3. The Labour Party Axmual '.Fonference Financial Report.. See 
also published lists of subscribers in the 0 standard", 
June - July, 1935. 
seats it already held. Semple had already conf'idently as-
(¢erted that the Labour star was in the ascendant. "Never be-
fore did he remember such pronounced hostility towards any 
Government". 1 0 
LOCAL ELECTIONS: 
With few by-elections to substantiate prophesy, the 
Labour party mmnbers were re+assured by the local-body elections 
in May, 19350 Labour Mayors were elected in Dunedin, Christ-
church, Petone and Gisborne aµd th.ere were advances in Labour's 
repres·entation on city councils. 2" In Auckland they gained 
seven additional seats, in Dunedinf three and in Wellington they 
won all of the Harbour Boero. seats. 
Labour opinion 3. held that municipal elections did 
not represent the true state of political feeling owing to the 
multiple property voting which was permissible 4· at that time. 
In the opinion of a local of'ficial, 5. it was very likely that 
multiple voting favoured the non-~abour candida»es. He quot ... 
t 
ed the case of one Im:!l.n, a Citizens Association candidate for 
1935 municipal elections in Christchurch, who was able to vote 
fourteen times by virtue of his many chairmanships in various 
businesses. This view of possible misrepresentatioq takes 
no account of the number of companies not represented in the 
1. The ttNew Za:iland <nWorker"," May 1st, 1935• 
2. ttNew Zealand Workertt, Wellington, May 22nd, 1935. 
3., ibido 
4.. See Loegl Authorities Hand.book, 1937-8, p.X. for regulations. 
5" The Ass.· Town Clerk, Christ church, in conversation with 
tlie writ er, 1 2th September, 19JJ.8. 
election through lack of' interest on the part of' those authoris-
ed to use the company vote. It is not possible to know 
whether the compan¥'8 representative voted for the traditional 
representative of the property-owning class. His political 
views might not coincide with those of' the management. 
From the National point of view, these municipal 
electionff, at least in Christchurch, had '3!aluable and heartening 
lessons to teach their politicians. This City Council had 
its Labour members reduced f'rom eight to four .. Councill or 
W. s. McGibbon _e:x;pressed his pleasure at the Labour repulse which 
showed that ttthe citizens can, when or•ganised, secure victory 
against the highly-organised Labour party machine. 1• 
Confidence fluctuated dm evePy party during the tr•ying 
months of' campaigning. Before long, tpe Nationalists were fid-
geting to be done with dragging end-of-session debates, knowing 
that in the electo1.,ates the Labour pa!lty ·workers and Democrat 
candidates were busy undermining Government support. To gain 
a majority of seats, Labour had to advance by seventeen;which 
would have seemed an improbable addition but for the threat of 
the Democrats. One of the staunchest supporters 2G of the 
Government complained that the Democrats would be practically 
an addition to· Labour. This same periodical in October, af'ter 
stoutly declaring that the Government would be returned to 
office, although Labour might slightly increase its voting power, 
1. 11Press0 ,-May 10th, 1935 .. 
2.. 11Mercantile Gazette", p.1,034, Vol. II, Sept. 18th, 1935. 
now cautiously ref'erred to ttthe prospect of' Labour being in 
1. 
power - a mere possibility." 
L~bou:b, too, had moments of gloom. Though they look= 
ed to the equitable franchise of the general eleetion giving 
them ev~;-.greater chances of winning new seats than did the 
\ ·' ·..._~-
enc oura gi ng victories of May, there was still the problem of 
the split vote to worry them, Electors were warned that al-
though none of the factions f'rom the Democrats down had any 
chance of defeating the Government, this intervention could only 
ttconfuse the issue and ease the ·Government's posi tion~ 1 2• 
Like most commentators, Labour journals over-estimated the Derno-
crat s' strength.. 1tThe balance of power is the maximum hope 
of the Democrat att, 3.. w~s an early estimate from the Socialist 
publication "Toinorrowtt. They were denounced as "wreckers0 
by the Nationalist :press. The ll:E'vening Posttt showed more 
interest than other newspapers when the new party was first 
formed. Often quite critical of the Coalition, it &aw in this 
creation of the Democrats a response to public desire for a 
change in the political situation, noting that there was general 
dissatisfaction with the Government. Some .favourable public= 
ity was given to the. new party's tentative policy until October 
13th, 1934. After this the "Evening Posttt returned to the 
Government fold until the following year when Hislop's announce-
4e 
ment o~ the party progr·annne was reported. The editor was 
impressed, encouraging readers to take hope from "the skilful 
1.. ibid. p.1,173, October 23rd. 
2. 11New Zealand Worker0 , May 29th, 1935. 
3.. 11 Tomorrow0 , July 24th, 1935• 
4.. "Evening Posttt, October 2nd, 1935. 
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appeal", yet advised them to reserve judgement unti 1 ttMr .. 
Hislop reveals his financial proposals in more detailu .. 
Other editors had already made UP. their minds, and the 
"Evening Post 11 soon ~~ the Na ti onal line with .them.. They 
probably agreed with the judgment of the pro-Labour view that 
0 the Democrats represent nothing but exc·eptionally narrow spec~ 
ial interests; and individual ambitions which hope to be car.r-
.1 
i ed into power without responsibility on the despression re-
sentment of the urban middle class*' .. 1" 
Another daily paper which had its Independent moments 
was the 0Auckland Star", which had no sympathy with Labour's 
hazily outlined fifth plank - the state control of currency. 
It criticized Savage on November 6th and 9th for lack of detail 
about cu!Tency propos~ls, but on November 8th took Forbes to 
task for his. violent language on the same subject. Reproving 
him fo.r "sc(;l:J:l.ettmongerJ.ng!~,, it .thought that Forbes was not en-
titled to say, having associated with the Labour members, that 
he respected them and then ask the country to believe that if 
the same members formed the Government, they would bring on the 
Dominion "a worse disast,er than the depression" .. 2 "' 
Possibly there wer·e other independent newspapers like 
the ''North Canterbury Gazettett edited by o. Duff, an Independent 
candidate in the Prime Minister's electorate, but it was rare 
in most of the Dominion's newspapers to find. any criticism of 
1.. "Tomorrow", August 21st, 1935 .. 




The Press's partiality was set aside for the reporting 
of candidate's meetings and speeches. Each candidate in the 
election, with the exception of the Cabinet Ministers and lead~ 
ers of parties, was allowed one colU.mn in which to expound his 
views and thereafter ~eceived only brief mention of meetings 
and short extracts from speeches. A candidate was allowed to 
nominate the meeting at which he would receive his full report. 1• 
The knowledge that the press was in sympathy with the 
Government transferred interest from editorials to the corres-
pondence columns. An occasional correspondent was appreciat~ 
ive of the editorial attitude towards letters hostile to press 
opinions, and seemed surprised that so many were printed. 
There was no evidence, however, that letters expressing hmstil-
1 ty to the Government predominated in the Christchurch "Press". 
An analysis 2 • of the correspondence in the two weeks preceding 
the election does not reveal anything, unless perhaps an e.di t-
orial weakness for anti-Labour letters. T:Q.ere is no evidence 
of' the great swing-over to Labour, which surely had crystallised 
by this time. 
It is curious that while politicians and editors con-
tinued to denounce Democrats with bitterness, the correspondents 
were neither critical nor much interested. Perhaps realising 
how little headway the third party had made, they wished to con-
1.. This information came f'rom an editorial reply, in the 
uPressu, November 4th, to a correspondent. 












centrate attention .on the two main contestants. In contrast 
wfuth the serious attention with which most electors heard elect-
ion speeches, they tended to treat the Democrats as an entertain-
ment in company with the weakest candidates ot other minor groups. 
The elector would not relish the ad.di tional leaflets t.o read and 
policy to puzzle over. More meetings to attend if he was to 
make up his mind fairly were tedious calls on his time.. It 
is very likely that the Democrats were dismissed as 'forlo1~n 
hopes' rapidly and only the person who got some fun out of' pol= 
itical meetings would bother to attend many. It would appear 
from the general tone of' newspaper corrnnent that the hopeless 
position of the Democrats as an alternative Government was clear 
1 0 by the end of October. 
The Government, too, failed to re-establish popular-
i ty.. Many of their supporting vote.rs were not very enthusias-
tic about t_hem, intoning two variations on this chord -o'f' dimin-
ished popularity; in a minor key "Better the devil we know. e ... tt 
or in cheerier mood they echoed Down1.e Stewart's "Better to Q}et t-
er the ills we have, than 'f'ly 'to those we know not of'u. It 
would, of course, have been impolitic for either National /~an­
dida t es or their allies, the press commantators, to admit the 
possibility of defeat but it must have occurred to them that 
the situation was critical. There was no doubt of the Govern= 
ment's earlier unpopularity but it was very difficult to assess 
how much ground they had recovered~ 
1. "Auckland Startt November 5th, 19 35: ttThey have not won 
any considerable body to their side". 
The Dominion tours made by the party leaders had re-
sults that ammensely strengthened Labour confidence, but in 
contrast.to the enthusiasm with which Savage was invariably 
received, Forbes often had disturbed meetings. The worst re-
ceptions were in the cities where pro-ID.bour audiences were 
boisterous, but even in the smaller rural towns• he had tr•ouble 
( 
in getting a hearing. At Dunedin he had 'many inter1"Uptions 
and "when Mr., T. K. s. Sidey endeavoured to move·· a vote of thanks 
1 .. 
to Mr .. Forbes ••• e he was literally howled down" G In a 
crowd of more than 2,000 at Invercargill one section 11 treated 
the proceedings with some levity but they were good=humoured 
and far from critical tt e 2• 
The North Island equivalent of the Dunedin tumult was 
experienced at Masterton, where the Prime Minister was counted 
out by a large section of the audience when he began to discuss 
the Labour Party's schemes. 0 The meeting terminated noisily , 
there being as much applause as booing 11 • 3., Speaking at Wang-
anui, Forbes referred to the Labour programme ttbut was almost 
continuously interrupted by cheerstto 4., In Christchurch "one 
noticeable feature of all the Prime Minister's meetings ..... has 
been the unusually large number of women who· attend". 5 • Ger':"" 
ts.inly more women voted at the election but their numbers rose 
· t' n n more th~n d1'd the men's~ 60 in propor .10 o Gt • There were no 
1.. ttpress", Christ church, November 18th, 1935 .. 
2., · ibid. November 21st, 1935., 
3. ibid., November 14th, 1935 .. 
l.j . ., ibid., November 12th, 1935. 
5., ibid., November 19th, 1935. 
6. Proportion % of votes recorded by men and women to total num-
ber_, o_:e.-el-~,ctors on the roll (From statistics in Appendix 
to .• /P •.. D.. ,.· 1936, A - J.) 19 28: Men, 89. 03, Women 87. 03e 
.12J.::t,-:--Men, 84 .. 51, Womenm:99. 1935:· Men, 92 .. 02, Women 
89 .. 46. 
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aspects of' policy directly addressed to women; their increased 
interest does indicate, though, the greater thoughtfulness with 
which the election was approached by all voterse 
Se.vage everywhere received very attentive hearings; 
1. .· §'11 . 
reports f'rom Ilamilton and Thames. · mention this and. also the 
large audiences and enthusiastic receptions. At Invercargill 
an excited audience carri eel the vote of thanks by singing flFor 
He's a Jolly Good Fellow0 3 • It is not surprising to find that 
Savage was openly forecasting that there would be a Labour Gov"'.' 
ermnent, not just in the effusive way of a politician advertis-
ing the party, but after weighing up the impressions he had re-
ceived during a comprehensive tour. He se.id, on his return 
to Auckland, that there were at least 50 seats in New Zealand 
where Labour had a fighting chance. "I am confident that the 
4~ Labour Party will have 43 to 44 seats in the next Parliament" .. 
This was the time of year for summing-up to be done 
as a guide to the voter who was still wondering how to use his 
vote to best advantage and might still be won over to the Nation-
ali.sts. In spite of the opportunities for reporte1 .. s to be in 
possession of as much information about meetings and tours as 
was possible for anyone to have, after following election cam-
paigns for several weeks in many districts served by their news-
papers, not even they predicted· the change that came .. Some of 
1.. 11Press 0 1 Christchurch, November 21st, 1935 .. 
2. ibid., Novembe1• 18th, 1935 .. 
3e ibid., November 13th, 1935. 
4o ttnominion", Wellington, November 22nd, 1935 .. 
their remarks were simply declarations of hopes couched in emot-
1 9 ive and persuasive languageo Some were more sober judge-
ments, but even so were suriJrisingly wrong in that the extent. 
of the capture of rural seats by Labour was seldom. envisaged., 
In the Auckland province where "the chief issue was 
a bitter fight over Labour's guaranteed prices scheme, 11 2 e the 
Democrats had made so little impression that they were not ment-
ioned·. Of the ten city electorates, five were considered cer= 
ta inti es for Labour and so they proved .. Only one of the re= 
maining five was felt to be a Government strongholde More 
hope was felt for retaining the country seats .. Even there only 
five out of fifteen were considered safe for the Nationali.sts 
but two of these five went to Labour as outright wins. 
There was the same foreboding about the Government 
seats in the southern half of the North Island, where a multi-
plici ty of candidates would make minority wins possible. There 
was no hope of' capturing any urban seats and slender cha.nee of 
retaining either· Wanganui or Palmerston North, .but of the ten 
rural areas the Government was expected to have to concede two 
only to Labour, while three more were considered unsafe. The 
results revealed that only one x•ural constituency was left to 
1., "There is a honeful~ chance that Mr, c. A. Boles (Nat .. ). will 
beat Mr. F. Langstone, the sitting member for Waimarino 11 ., 
11Presstt, Christchurch, November 22nd. urn Manukau, Mre 
W.J. Jordan (Lab.) who loses no chance of ingra~~ing 
himself with the electors, is having a harder fight 
this time". ibid .. , November 22nd, 
The emphasis is mine .. 
2. "Evening Post 11 , Wellington, Novembe1 .. 26th, 1935 .. 
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the Nationalistse 
There was more pessimism about Nelson and Cant~rbury 
seats, but with less reason@ The Nationalists lost only two 
of the six seats held, but only Forbes felt confident of being 
returned. In Motueka it was expected that "Holyoake's· person-
ali ty and sinceri tytt 1 0 were likely to mitigate the Government's 
uripopulari ty. This hope was realised but elsewhere it was 
held that that the Government's chances were prejudiced by prob-
able vote-splitting and by the increasing defection of small 
farmers to Labour. The Temuka seat brought the curious result 
©f remaining National when most observers prophesied its loss. 
The Le.bour newspaper 2" made the same mistake about Mid-Canter-
bury .. It correctly- claimed that 11 the Government will lose 
Otago seats" 3e uLi• G The "Evening Post agreed, putting the losses 
at three; results made it four. There was expected to be a 
close fight for Dunedin West, whose retiring member was the 
former Minister, W.D. Stewart. He considered that there 
was a huge inarticulate mass of Liberals in the country and 
thought that the result of the election would be "confusing11 . 5,, 
He expected that there would have to be another appeal to the 
electorate. This forecast was more wide of the target than 
any other and was indicative of the extreme di_fficulty of in-
terpreting the mood of the people., 
1.. "Evening Posttt, Wellington·, November 12th, 1935 .. 
2 e "Standardtt, V'fellington, November 6th, 1935 .. 
3. ibid., November 6th. 
49 °Evening Post 0 , November 26th, 1935" 
5.. The ttPresst', Christchurch, November 20th .. 
Not even the best informed forecaster could feel 
certain that he had heard the populace's heartbeat distinctlyu 
Sudden shocks could wake it skip a beat or two. Budget 
announcements probably won some grateful widows, war veterans 
and other pensioners, and some Governinent employees, whereas 
the Scrimgeour radio sensation on November 24th probably in= 
fluenced waverers. to join the Labour cause. The very weight 
of the Press battery against Labour may have roused resentment 
in some electors who voted against the Government. Practic-
ally the whole Press of the Dominion were trying as hard as 
the politicians to bend the people to their will. With a 
Hitlerian force fulness they told and retold their conservat-
ive tale, urging people to play safe. But the recent econom= 
ic transfusions had sent such a heartn~ing flow of new blood 
'> 
through the bodies of depression victims that they felt adven-
t!JJi"OUS and unwilling to take the rest of the treatment. 
THE ELECT I ON AND THE REBUL'rs. 
~-""-~=
With the arrival of' election day all attempt to 
persuade the elector was halted. Newspapers published no 
letters relating to politics. No further contact with vot-
ers was made by candidates. The Christchurch "Press11 re-
placed its usual impersonal weather report f'or the day vvi th 
. h ·l ~ "'"f f' t d th th t . some Joyous p rases: 1110 more per ec ay _an a enJoy-
ed in the city yesterday could h8.Ve been wished f'or, a.nd com-
ing as it did after a. return to temperatures s.:pproaching those 
of' mid-winter, it was all the more welcome. The sun shone 
b.rightly from an almost cloudless sky from early morning .. 
The evening was f'ine and clear·~ and favoured· the large crowds 
which gathered in the Square to hear the announcement of' the 
election results". 
In Auckle.nd that evening) there was a dif'f'erent sort 
of'· enjoyment. The "Press" reported = "Wild Enthusiasm -
Vast Audience cheers Mro Savage". He seemed to have arous-
ed admiration even among opponents. The "Evening Post" 20 
reported his Auckland reception as a personal triumph f'or the 
ttpersuasi ve and urbane" Labour leader, and paid tribute to 
Labour's enthusiasm and infectious f'aith. It also commend-
ed the Labour leaders for viewing their victory as imposing 
1 e 11Press0 , ChristchuPch, Nov. 28th, 1935. 
2. November 28th, 1935. 
a great responsibility on them for the people's welfare. 
In Wellington at a less happy: gathering Colonel 
o. H. Weston, chairma.n of the Ne.tional Poli ti cal 1'1 ederat ion, 
praised the Labour Party for having fought a 11 c1ean, fair 
fight It. 1e Forbes agreed and connnented on the Labour 
Party's wonderfUllyfwell-·organi sed campaign·e His next pub-
lie announcement was of his own withdrawal from the premier-
ship and the calling together of the Cabinet for the follow-
ing day (Nov. 29th). The Government's resignation was de-
cided on for the Wednesday, a week after the election da.te~ 
1rhe new Labour cabinet was chosen by the next day and sworn 
in two days later. 20 This leisurely procedure, which was 
repeated by Holland and Fraser at the changeover in 1949, 
was in marked contrast with the swi:ft reversal in Brita.in in 
1945. 3• Churchill's resignation and Attlee's appointment 
took place within the half'-hour on the evening of' July 20th 
when the final counting was done. 
There were thPee Cabinet Ministers among the defeat-
ed Coalition meraberse J. Bitchener (Waitaki) was over sev-
enty years old and took no prominent part in campaigning so 
his defeat may not have surprised the Nationalistse The 
other two were O.E. MacMillan (Tauranga) and J·.A. Young 
(Hamil ton) in Auckland electox·a.tes where political tension 
1. 11Standard", December 4th, 1935. It was reported that 
another voice had commented: uThat' s more than cs.n 
be said for the other side"• - presumably the Demo-
crats. ' 
2., 11Presstt, December 5th, 1935. 
3. Maccallum and Readman, "The British General Election of 
1945 tt' PP 245.,,.6 8 
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had been highest. There was no valedictory for these men 
but it was regretted 1" th"@t "the swing of the pendulum lack-
ed ability to discriminate •••• Mr. Downie Stewart ought not 
to have been a vi ct imu. His resistance to party pressure 
to accept measures he thought violated honest economic prin-
ciples had not been forgotten. There were still many who 
considered him a martyr to an 'lil.nprincipled Cabinet, Coates 
having suffered most from comparisons with the still untarn-
ished Stewarto 
The toil-stained Coates had gone out on the depress-
ion tide and now had great difficulty in getting back. It 
is significant that both the Prime Minister and the Finance 
Minister retained their seats on minority votes. Coates 9 s 
majority was reduced to 302 over the Independent candidatee 
The Democrat made little diff'erence in the contest 2 • so that 
it appears to have been hostility to Coat es and not the third 
party's intervention which reduced Kaipara to a minority seat .. 
Where Coates made enemies, Forbes was more toleratedo 
He lost the people's confidence because of his mediocrityo 
To the thousands who like to see in the Prime Minister a kin-
dred spirit, It1 orbes might have been quite popular in years 
of plenty. While his subordination to the abler Coates had 
saved him from personal enmity to the same extent, it had also 
left him with small claim to the nation's confidence in his 
1,, "Evening Postt', Nov. 28th, 1935G See also similar 
connnents in 11 Round Tableu, Vol. 26, p.427. 
2. Coates 4, 738 votes, Grounds L.i-,436, Caughley 528. 
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1 eadership. Coates's unpopularity undoubtedly reacted on 
the fortunes of the rest of the party$ There was a severe 
rejection of Na tioI18.li sts - a ttpoli ti cal landslidett said the 
newspapers. Many Nationalists were defeated and of the 
seventeen 1. returned, eleven had decreased majoritiese 
ANALYSIS OP THE RF.1SULT: 
Jl:lections do not conform to mathematical probabil-
ities and the law of averages. 'rhe greater t:-~e number of 
contending parties a.nd the smaller the rnimber of candidates 
in each, the less chance there is of having a calculable re-
sult or one corresponding to the strength of each party as 
revealed by their share of the total votes. 
Although there is no doubt that the Lsbour Party 
was the most popular of any group contest·ing the election, it 
was largely fortuitous that fifty-three Labour members were 
returned. The results exaggerated the amount of public ac-
ceptance of' their policy, which nevertheless could now be im-
posed upon the: majority who hs.d not voted for it. The al-
location of seats did not do justice to the National Party's 
following and certain of the lesser political groupings had 
no voice in the m tional administration, though they repres= 
ented a considerable po1•tion o:f pubJ.ic opinion· in the country. 
The seating in the House would have been consider= 
ably different had each party been represented in proportion 
to the votes given theme 
1s Seventeen, plus two who were new members of Parliament. 
11 o. 
TABLg NINE • 













Candid- Va.lid Won Vote.s due pro~/ of votes per 
ate~ Votes port lye/ Candidate. 


















































~ Country Party. 
It is clear ths.t though Labour may not .have had a 
maj9rity election, only they were entitled to govern. They 
a:pproached close to having half' the available votes; so 
near that had there been proportionate allocation of seats 
they would have had only 4 fewer than an absolute majority. 
Pour Independents and one Democrat wera elected who had always 
favoured Labour, so there would sca1"cely have been a px•oblem 
of minority goverrunente 
Gerta.inly the National Party could not, under pro= 
111 .. 
portional representation, have cla.imed title to Cabinet pos-
i tions. Even if they had so achieved 26 seats instead of 
19 actual, and had amalgamated with five possible Democrat 
additions (under such a scheme there would have been five, 
not six,as Atmore was in Labour's camp), that would still 
have given them a group only 31 strong. 
Since Labour had over 110, 000 votes more· than their 
nearest rivals, it was reasonable that they should have suf~ 
fici ent seats to give theni a clear majority. If hampered 
by having to make unsatisfactory combinations with Ind.epend-
ent s who might have demanded add legislation for their sup-
port, the Labour Government would not have had a fair chance 
to put into action the prograrmne on which the;y- were later to 
be judged once more. They could, as results stood, go 
ahead unfettered in the knowledge that a fair accompli would 
win over many of' the doubtful section of the electors .. 
Besides the large numbers of voters who had active-
ly rejected Labour, there were al so those who had been faced 
with only second-best choices in candidates through the lack 
of a representative from the party they fa vouredv There 
were six pakeha electo1"a.tes where no National candidate stood; 
Labour failed to provide candidates for six pa.lceha and all 
Maori electorates. 1 • (See Table 10)a 
1 " Th erel.' Wel?el:, .th:F,ee1<UW10frfte-iB 1 Labot1r candidates in Maori 
electorate.s, the most favoured getting only 644 votes 
so it is unli.kely that they were loolrnd on as Labou:b. 
trhe Ratana candidates, however, ~olled very well -
perhaps because Tirikatene (M.P.) was a known Labour 
slipJ?orter. If (as could be done at the next election) 
their votes were added to Labour's total, this would 
have given the Govt., over 50% of the total votes i. e 
a majority. 
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Then there were other minorities everywhere with 
no opportunity for expression. 'rhousands of Liberals had 
PI'obably been disenfranchj_secl by the coalition of their Unit-
ed Party with the conserve.ti ve Reform. They might perhaps 
be considered better able to accept the Nationalist programme, 
with its promises of State housing and health schE!mes, 1. 
than Corn;ierva ti ves. Among them~ however, were some who 
formed a small, new Liberal Party fol"' the elect,i on, suggest-
ing that they could not look on the leadership of· Forbes as 
sufficient assurance of t.he Liberal content of the National· 
Party's platform. 
There were good reasons for the Labour and Nation-
al Parties' decision not to go to the polls in full strength. 
Closer· exa.mination of the results shows that in etght of 
these fifteen seats there were strong candidates who won with 
absolute majorities;- 4 Labour men, 3 Independents and 1 
National (Nga ta of Eastern Maori) o Their strength must 
have been obvious before the campaign began and a deterrent 
to rival parties' wasting money attacking safe seats. One 
other seat was retained without trouble by Atmore, who, 
though calling himself Democrat, had been for years previous-
ly an Independent, usually voting with Labour. 
Of the other five seats where there might have been 
hope for another candidate, two had close voting simply be= 
cause of competition from two other candidates - a foarth 
added to the contest would not have clarified the position 
1. "Dominion", November 22nd, 1935e 
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TABLm TEN._ NO LABOUR OPPOSITION. 
•\<"-/ '-. ------,·--. ~ ..... -.-.--~ . .,......, •• ~~..._.,.._,....,_.,""""-...,.....,._,,.,..~~"'"''---••·~·"'~"'~"~·.,._..,-.-,._.,,,,~,..-,.~::,~::::,l~"""''.........,,.,,.,"":'7';,:,:~ • ....,.,,.,,.J,~..,,,,_~,r'--.,...,--..-,.,,..~.,.. ...... _..., .... _~~·; q. <q.~I 
Electorate Successful /-·· Corxtest s Other 
Candidate Safe Olocie Minority Candida.t'~s. 





:mast. Me ori 
North 11 
! South tt 
I I West 11 
l ' 
Rushworth (I) x 
Sexton (I) x 
MacDougall (I) x 
Atmore (D) x 
Coates (N) 
Ngata (N) x 
Henare (N) 
Ti rilrn t ene (Ra) 
Te To mo 
1 ii
I I· ' I l : NO NATIONAL OPPOSITION. I Auck, Central! I Avon 
Gisborne 
Thames 
Parry (L) x 
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so the Labour Party was wise in not presenting rmew members 
of their party at such difficult contests as Franklin and 
Mat aura. 
It is surprising to fi~d that even without a Labour 
candidate to oppose him~ Coates had a hard struggle against 
the Independent, Grounds, who was within 300 votes of the 
MinisterQ Henare' s i-•educed support was natural in a con= 
test with 6 other candidates, but Coates's reduction must be 
considered a pei-•sonal defeate He was the real spolcesman 
of an unpopular administration. His inability to retain 
even the same amount of support as Forbes did, was in ratio 
to the greater responsibilities he had had to shoulder. 
TABL~~J ELEVEN. 
--""'"""---•-i.-il'=m . =~~----111,r---=-~-------~-----~-
15 Highest Individual Votes. Highest% of Votes Received. 
Nash (Lab.) 11,878 Webb (Lab.) 76t 
Lee It 9,828 Parry It 75 
Jordan 11 9,345 Lee If 74~ 
Sullivan 11 8,955 Nash tt 74! 
Richards " 8,728 Armstrong' 73 
Savage 1t 8,567 Savage it 73 
Howard a 8,46L1- Sullivan 11 72 
Armstrong'' 8,299 Jordan It 70~ 
Semple ti 8,208 Wilkinson (Indo) 70 
M~Keen II 8,170 Fraser (Lab.) 69 
F1"aser II 8,113 Howard ti 69 
Mason 11 7,749 Mason ti 68 
Jones it 7,715 ·O'Brien u 68 
Barnard Yf 7,290 McKeen ti 67 
Mccombs ii 6,955 Barnard If 66 
.. 
TABLE ELEVEN (C9ntd.): 
r~ighest WV~~-;s for-·-~~~~~;;~. Hjghest Votes for Democ_rats., 
! Holland 6,174 Reed 3,895 
Bodkin 5,994 Stallworthy 3,481 
Endean 5,758 Veitch 3,308 
Smith 5,662 Hislop 2,688 
Roy 5,445 McKenzie 2,640 
Campbell 5,212 Caro 2,479 
Stewart 5,200 Donald 2,045 
McDonald 2,033 Kyle 5,123 
' ! 
l H 1 5 11 8 I ! o yoake , 5 Neiderer 2, 1 2 r 
' . J~~-----·--.~.,..........-......,.,,...-~ . ...,~._.,,..,-. ..........,..._ __ ~..,.,..,.,..,,.~.-~..,...~.,,,...._....~,,..,,"l"<'t-"'"""'="-~-"'"~t---=~-==o<e~·J!l.c="-'O;,=--""'"""':~~i.i.nl, 
One guide to the popularity of the contestants is 
the proportion of votes they received out of the total poll 
in their elector·ates,, The results 1" show that just as 
Labour won most seats, their candidates won the honours for 
candidates receiving most votes. Twenty-four Labour can-
didates received higher totals than the highest National 
total of 6, 174 votes, the record score being 11, 878 for l\Ja'she 
H.e was returned with the greatest majority also - 7, 757 .-
and for the second time his cons ti tu ency recorded the highest 
number of valid votes - 15,989, ( 1931: 15,551) o 
National and Democrat candidates were far out-
distanced. The only candidates to approach Labour. for pop= 
uls.ri ty were Rushworth and Wilkinson, who received respect-
ively 60% and 69% of their electorates' total votese No 
1.. Table 11e 
National ce.ndida.te received more than 6Q;;l. The highest 
individual poll ( 6, 17L~) went to Holland of Christ church 
North, but his share was less than 50% of the votesa 
The Democrats fared worst - the greatest support 
for any one of them being only 33%· Their failure was 
spectacular and unexpected. No one thought they could win 
many seats but it was a surprise to most observers when they 
failed to win any. There were s. few close fights in three-
cornered contests but no Democrat managed to poll.more than 
a third of the possible votes. Veitch, retiring member 
f'or Wanganui, did best but most Democrats lost their de= 
1 • posits. Their greatest support came from urban areas 
but unfortunately while their businessmen supporters were 
concentrated there, so were the working e-lass families who 
were firmly attached to Labour and far outnumbered the more 
well-to-do electors• 
Another guide to the changed conditions of' election 
in 1935 is seen in the decreased and inc1~eased ma. jor·i ti es for 
retiring members. In this election 21 Labour candidates 
received increased ma.jori ties compared with 2 Nationalist.s • 
.All but one of' the elected Independent ca.ndid_a tes had in-
creases and so did Rushworth of the Country Party. Decreased 
1 ., Candidates losing de~its: Democrats: 32 out of' 56. 
Independents: 25 l+2e Liberals: 4/;5. Commun= 
ists: 3/3. Independent=Lsbour: 4/5. National= 
i st s: 1 /74. Socialist: 1. Country Party: 1 /3. 
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majorities were sui':fered by 4 Labour men; and by 11 Nation-
alists, most of their setbacks being in rural areas. 
TABLn; TWI-iJL VE. 
Places returning Labour for the fgst t~ 
,,,..,..,..,.,.,..-..,.~- .. ._-,...,...,,,.~""'-'~-'".._..,._..,~.~,..,_,. .. .,.~.-~~~··-.....-~~~~"''"""""=~~~,.......,..,.~~.,,,..-.-."""'.-·.-.~~~·,..--=u·,.,-....... ~.,""'"-'-''-"""""~•-.....,.,.,__. ~---,,_._:_.,_,,,.,..,_ • ..,, ••• ,...,. ___ .-~ 
· URB4_N. 
_EURAL. 
N. I. Waitemata N. I. Marsden N.I. Waipawe. 
If Eden " Thames II Masterton 
ti Hamilton It Hauraki ti Wairarapa 
" 
Wanganui II Tauranga II Rangitikei 
" 
Palmerston It Waikato ti Otaki 
It Rotorua 
" 
Bay of Plenty 
" 
Hawkes Bay 
s. r. Dunedin w. S.I. Wairau So I. Kaiapoi 
It Dunedin c. II Mido Canty. It Waitaki 
It Invercargill ti Oamaru 0 Chs.lmers 
8 + 13 + 6 = TOTALS: 19. 
== 
~~· ... ·--------------·········· ···-·· 
Urban 6 9 13 18 
80 Rural 3 8 2 
9 17 15 34 
118., 
This brings us to the question: Was it in rural 
areas that the Nationalists lost ground? Which groups 
had Labour won over'? Going back to 1931 we find that 
in the North Island Labour h9d previously held 13 urban seat 8 
and only 2 rural ones. 
,.\ 
I • The 1935 results levelled the 
previous predominance of city support as 14 rural areas 
swung over to Labour. Nine of these electorates were areas 
wher•e de.irying predo:J1:i.nated - :bhe small fapmers' in•eserve 
in the North Island, the region of greatest advance by the 
social credit monetary re.formers. Six more of the 29 
South Island seats were added to the 9 already held by Lab-
our, so that they were now returned from half of the South 
Island seats. These additions represented a good cross 
section of the people, 3 being urban seats, Z rural and Kaia-
poi predominantly rurale 
In both islands now the proportion of Labour's 
urban to rural seats was 9 to 8: almost an equal following 
in town and country. By observing changes in public opin= 
ion in later elections, it is possible to conclude that it 
was the rural areas that the greatest fluctuations took 
place. Lipson 2• observed that by 1943, when the farmers 
were generally prosperous again and had some grievances 
against the administration, Labour lost heavily in rural 
areas as "farmers swung back to their normal political 
allegiance'' e 
i,, See l118.ps in .Appendix D, showing urban and rural elect= 
orates and Tables 12 and 13. 
2e Lo Lipson, "The Politics of Equality0 , p .. 235. 
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Then why had they changed over in 1935? Was it 
dislike of the previous ad.ministration or satisf'action with 
the Lal:'.>our platrf'orm that moved them? Obviously both fact-
ors influenced voters but the posi.tive reason would have 
greater force. They were simply satisfying the desire for 
safeguards for security and inclined too> to the party offer-
ing the most new services. In 19LJ.3, having security and 
satisfied that the guaranteed price had fulfilled its need,, 
the farmer now was weighing the advantages to be gained by 
supporting a party not so. devoted to urban interests end 
dominated by industrial connections. 
MINORITY SEATS: 
Was it true, as so many thought .at the time, that 
it was the intervention of the Democrats in the critical con-
tests that defeated the Government? 
There were 35 electorates in.which a candidate was 
returned by a minority vot~. Labour won in 22 of these, 
polling 96~_, 803 votes against 133, .5-4 7, i.e. they received 42°fo 
of the total votes, less than the Nationalists' total. It 
appears at f'irst the.t Labour candia_ates had less right to 
their victories than their opponentse However, a closer 
inspection of election results in these contests; reveals that 
' 
in many cases it is difficult to judge whether the seat would 
have been won by the National or the Labour. candidate had the 
intruding minor candidates been eliminated. Nor is it 
120. 
likely that the Democrats were to bleme for the Nationalists' 
losing votes, when in so me.ny electorates there were addi t-
ional candidates who might just as readily have benefitted 
had the Democrats been eliminatedo 
For these reasons 7 of the 35 minority seats have 
been dismissed from the discussion, because confused compet-
ition among many candidates makes it unreasonable to judge 
wb.:ich way a few stray votes might have gone. 
In the reme.ining 28 minority seats were included 
three in which the Nationalists had little chance of over-
taking the Labour lead. They were Eden, Wanganui and Inver-
L 
cargill. Eden went to Anderton because the rettring 
member, Stallworthy, not only had on him the taint of Coalition 
but had also ta.ken on the Democrat label, associating with a 
party unlikely to reach Cabinet rank and therefore impotents 
Anderton' s lead of 2,500 would probably have been decreased 
had the Democrat been eliminated, but it is unlikely that 
Clarke (Nate) could then have won, since Anderton was better 
known, having twice before contested the seat. 
1 e ~· WANGAl\J-UI. 
J_,., Anderton L .. Cotterill J.+887 
N. Clarke 3458 Do Veitch 3308 
Do Stallworthy 3L1.81 N. Bain 1754 
Ie Pickering 155 I. Hogan 
INVER CARGILL. 
L. Denham 




N. Miller 2708 
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WANGA~TIJI was a similar case. Veitch, an ex-
Coalition member was the one menaced by the Nationalist, not 
vice versa, but it is unlikely that he could have drawn all 
of Bain's votes to overtake Cotterill (Labo) 
INVERCARGILL: Here again the National candidate 
was the newcomer and unlikely to have done any better with 
fewer competitors. Reed (D.) was the Mayor of Invercargill 
and a Prohibitionist in a di strict where that conviction was 
a popular one, while both Denham (L) and McChesney (Lib.) had 
polled well in 1931 against the very popular Hargest. 
Twenty five electorates remain, where either Demo~ 
crats or Independents caused the winning of minority seatss 
Fifteen times it was a Democret who split the vote - ten times, 
an Independent. Lipson 1'.conslders th!?.t nit is reasonable 
to assume'' that most of the votes for• Democrats were taken 
.from the Ifational candidates in these 15 contests. That is 
true of those electorates where the Ne.tional candidates were 
the retiring members.,.. receiving only a few hundred votes -less 
than the successful L8bour candide.tes. With luck and no 
Democrats, most o.f the extra votes could just heve tipped the 
scales in their favour. The Labour gains in at least nine 
of those fifteen electorates could reasonably be said to have 
been made at the Nationalists' expense. :But in the remain-
der there were Independents among the ce.ndidates who were only 
a little less .favoured than the Democrats and who might well 
heve shar•ed in sny redistribution, keeping compt:irati ve dis-
1.. op. cit. p.231 .. 
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tances between Nations.l Bnd Labour men much the same. 
Of course, the Independents did their share of 
splitting votes, but they are a constent factor in elections 
and have to be e:x.--pected as part of the risks of the game .. 
Their numbers ere observed 1 • to increase in critical elect= 
ions such as 1931 and 19~3, when they may be taken as a warn~ 
ing of unrest and impending chsnge in the electorate's loyal-
ties. Although the National Party could not have expected 
the debacle that occurred$! they were fearful enough to spend 
money warning electorf; not to waste their votes on In.depend-
ent adventurers. 
More thfl!.n two-thirds of, the seats won by minority 
votes were those of' sme.ller electorates having between 9,000 
and 12,000 electors. In constituencies of over 16,000 vot= 
ers, no minority seats were gs ined .. Most of these large 
electorates were in city areas, wh.ere, of' course, L8bour• was 
unshakeable,, but it is still true to say that s.bnor•mal results, 
causing minority wins, do tend to occur in the smaller con= 
stituencies. The larger the number of electo1"s, the close1" 
to its correct proportion does party popularity become. It 
is impossible to say what effect larger populations in the 
crucial minoPity seats~ would have had upon those contests. 
Probably none, as in most cases there were indications that 
the successful candidate had some advantage over the others 
to .ear·n him the extra votes. 
1. Lipson, ope cit. p.229 and p.235. 
THE ATTITUDE OF THTit]j_J~L~g: 
Theroe has been a steady increase in pul)lic inter= 
est in elections since last centuroy; the expansion of edu-
cation has played a papt, so have new techniques of election= 
eering and the widening distribution of newspapers; great= 
est of all is the ever-widening influence of' State action .. 
The keen interest of the public in the election 
campaign, the packed meetings, the questioning had all aroused 
comment from old ca.mp8.igners. There was a corresponding 
participation in voting, althou~h it was not as great as in 
1938 and 1946 when 93% and 95% respectively of the total 
electoral roll accorded votes. 1 • In 1935 the numbei-•s were 
90. 757'6. 2 • The years immediately past had called for ex= 
tensions of the State into people's lives by the creation of 
unemployment benefits-, by provision of' temporary work;· by 
unpreoidented act·ions in raising the exchange rate 8.nd im.pos-
ing controls on conditions of crecli t. Many young p eop 1 e 
had reason to be even more keen to take part in their first 
election by reason of having been made much more aware of the 
impor•tance of Government decisions in their lives. The 
suspension of the twenty-one year olds' right to vote in 1934 
would make participation the next year> all the keener, so that 
there would be fewer than usual neglecting to vote .. 
It was noticed that women were showing greater in-
terest in the election than usual according to a report 3. of 
1. Appe.11dix to P. D. 1939 and 1947 H. 33. 
2.. i oid. , 1936_, H. 33. 
3. Supra Ch. VI, 9 .. 20. 
one of Forbes's Chr•istchurch meetings. Though a hi ghe1 .. 
percentage of votes was cast by women than for previous 
years in certain electorates, viz .. Hurunui and Kaipara, the 
constituencies held by Forbes and Coates, as a whole women 
were less interested than men.. This was true of all elect~ 
orates but there were differences between the women of rural 
and city constituencies, rural women taking less part in vot-
ing than townswomen did - no doubt mainly because of thei1., 
greater diff±0ulty in attending polling booths and neglect 
of' the availability of' the postal vote. The greater inter-
est of farmers in Goverrunent policies was ieft to be express-
ed more by the men .. 
Few people can consider that their lives are not, 
in some way, vitally bound up with the choice of government. 
In 1935 this feeling must have been particularly strong and 
the public's attitude was recorded both by their choice of 
representative and by the greater participation in voting. 
We have seen that the Labour Party did not win this 
election on its own merits entirely. Yet consider what 
would have been the result if the election had taken place 
at any earlier time either by reason of conforming to tri-
ennial elections or by any unusually critical change in nat-
ional feeling.. The Coalition's popularity had been at 
lower ebb than in 1935, and with only an embryo Democ-ra t 
Party to compete with the Opposition, it seems likely that 
Labour would have been returned and perhaps more decisively 
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in regard to total voting strength. 
There was naturally much debate after the eJ.ect-
i on as to whether the new Government had a mandate or not, 
and whether a party with only 46% of the votes hed a right 
to impose radical policies on the nationa The question was 
merely academic as there was no alter•native to a Labou1~ Gov-
ernment. The unpredictabili.ty of election results had 
earlier prompted a minority effort to make some alteration 
to the electoral system which would allow parties to gain 
seats more nearly in accord with their voting strengtho 
But netther of the major parties wanted it. Both preferr-
ed the gamble which could return them to power by the chance 
of' minority votes. 
~ach stood to win or lose so much, but the risk 
had its attractionse The Mationa.lists, if returned at this 
crucial stage, could have hoped to swing the balance of pop-
ularity to their side by increasing the tempo of recoverye 
Another three years might have reconciled them to the people. 
The Labour Party, on the other hand, put in by a people 
weary of insecurity and seemingly insoluble problems, to see 
what they could do, might hope to work up their somewhat doubt-
f'ul following into convinced support from the majority of 
electorse Three years would give them time to show their 
paces bBfore the next big race. 
126 .. 
IN RE'rROSPECT. 
The Nation..-:1.l Party had· only slender hopes of re-
taining a majority. Attacked on all sides they had had to 
drop back to a stolid defence that the hard times had been 
caused by world conditions impossible to resist, and that it 
had not been easy to deal with the crisis that developed, 
with one party in Parliament contributing nothing but critic~ 
isme They had to beat off charges of' Toryism from Labour 
and of Socialism from the Democrats, of subservience to an 
out-moded financial system from the monetary x•efoi-'m bloc and 
of tinkering with sound finance from the opponents of exchange 
adjustment" 
The increased exch.9nge· rate did not bring the 
gx•ateful response expected from the farmers, who considered 
that it came too late., Without their gratitude, it was 
useless to have 'destroyed the unions' bargaining power, to 
have sent unemployed men (away from homes and f'amilies) to 
earn a few shillings ds.ily at farm labouring. It was use-
less to have alienated mortgagors and loan agencies, the city 
bu.sinessmen and their few Parliamentary representatives, if' 
farmers continued to resent the initial shock to their in-
comes, seeking consolation in the promises of credit-control 
advocatese 
By 1935 the Coalition was suffering from fs tigue 
and exposuree Its members were ageing and their morale 
was poor. Having spent their ammunition with a f'ew shots 
:from the Budget, they had to rely on a scrap heap of spent 
endeavour, while Labour accusers fanned the fires of resent-
ment in unemployed, teachers, pensioners, white collar work-
ers, housewives and all who had known the ·bitterness of want. 
Labour's wisdom in refusing to join a National 
Coalition saved them from association with a Governi-nent which 
pleased none for long. The critics of Coates 9 s 0 socialism" 
taught Labour to soften its radical tone but they retained 
enough "new thought '1 to give hope to the struggling. In 
town and in country the people were tired of the Coalition 
and its attendant shadows. Though in rejecting the Nat-
ionalists they f'illed the vacancy with a Labour Government 
to their own surprise,they doubtless felt relief that the 
political situation was so cl early resolved and an end made 
to unsatisfactory co1npromi se .. 
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5 7 Rugby St re et,, 
Meri vale, 
CIIRISTCHURCH. 
28th May, 194.8. 
I am engaged in research on the history of 
the General Election of 1935 in New Zealand for 
the :purpose of complt?ting my studies for the M.A. 
degree. 
I should be very glad of any help you may 
be able to give me in gathering source mat e:r•ial. 
Enclosed is a questionnaire on the personal hi stoi"'y 
of candidates, which you will, perhaps, be good 
enough to fi 11 in and return to me .. 
It would be of great assistance to me if you 
could suggest any author·i ties (published material or 
persons) who could supply information about the 
electoral contests, the political parties or the 
issues. 
Yours faithfully, 
(Miss) C. G. Rollo. 
A~~NDIX A. (Contd.) 
TO CANDIDATES OF THID 1935 ELECTION IN 
IN NJtJW ZEALAND. 
Would you please be so kind as to supply 
personal data relevant to the 1935 election, in answer 
to the questions below. Any information so given 
will be treated as confidential and will be used only 
for the complication of numex•ical tables. 
Name~ 
Age (1935),. 0 0 •••• 0 ••••••• 
Primary: G 0 0 0 1:1 .8 Q 8 • 0 0 G • 9 GI ID $ G O Q 0 0 O Q • 0 0 G 9 0 0 
Secondary: 
University 
Other sources of education not 
included in the above account •...•..••••.•• 
Occupation (1935) e e ea• e • o • o o ea•• e o e e: •e o o o • o •a 
T·rade Union connections .••...•••••••.•••••.•••• 
Public se1•vice on elect.ed 
Local Gove:r·nro.ent Councils ••••••••••••••••.••••• 
Previous service in the H·ouse (mark with a tick) 
1919-1922; 1922-1925; 1925-1928; 1928~1931; 
1931-1935. 
If candidates haa_ a record of service in the Honse 
previous to 1919 please state the number of yeB.rs 
so engaged ••.••. ····~·· 
If candidate was elected to the House in a by-election 
please give the month and year o:f' election ••••••..•••• 
Thank you f6r your co-operation. 
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~PPEIIDIX A. (Contg..!...} 
In order that informat_ion about candidates 
might be as accurate as possiblet letters accompanied 
by questionnaires were sent out to those wbout whom 
information was lacking. Some candidates had very 
full biographies in reference books such as Schole-
fi eld' s "Dictionary of New Zealand Biogra.phy11 , and in 
"Who's Who in New Zesls.nd 11 , so thP.t it was not necessar-y 
to write to every man Ol" woman. M:Bny, howevel", were 
untpaceeble, so that the i-iecords were not completed. 
Moreover, many of the candid.at es to whom letters were 
sent either did not reply (no doubt for a variety of 
reasons) or took the trouble to answer thet they refused 
to comment.. On the other hand several candidates made 
the effort to write in addition, valuable comments about 
the election period and personali tiese 
2. 
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.APPENDIX B.1. 
SIMILARITIES IN LABOUR AI~D DJiJMOCRAT POLICIES. 
Restoration of unemployed to noPmal 
work at full normal wages. 
Legislation for a minimum wage and 
salary to provide an adequate living 
standard for a 11 workers. 
Restoration of all wage cuts to civil 
servants. 
Restore all cuts made in wages and 
salaries. 
Restore to e sound position the Super-
annuation Fund and protect the full 
supers.nnuation rights of all civil 
servants. 
Me.intain the gue.rantees of the Public 
Service Superannuation system. 
Establish a Nation8l Superannua.tion 
Scheme, and increase pensions for wid-
mvs1 soldiers, aged people and other 
beneficiar·i es. 
Provide a superannuation and pensions 
system to supply an adequate income to 
the aged, the ailing~ the widows and 
others unable to earn their own livinge 
Establish a. National Eeal th Schernee 






Restore confidence in business by 
reduction of taxation and the stim-
ulus of our employment policy; de-
velop secondary industry and encour-
age the investment of British capi ta.l 
in this country., 
Organise productive developi11ent employ-
ment thr•ough Public Works, assistance 
to local euthori ties and fostering se.c-
onde,ry industry. 
A sound and practical education policy. 
Re-orgAnisation of education system. 
Buree.ucratic controls of' Boards and 
Commissions to be replaced by adviso:tJy 
bodies. 
H.estoration ·of Mortgage Corporation to 
a Government Department. 
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1Rew Zealan() 1abour ~~rtr 
(Palmerston North Branch) 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
How do you like the way the Forbes-Coates com-
bination are handling the Economic Crisis with its--
WAGE CUTS DISMISSAL OP WORKERS 
PENSION REDUCTIONS WITH ITS CLASS LEGISLATION 
(Widows, Old Age, Etc.) 
\\' ould you like to see the Coalition Government 
removed from the Treasury Benches ;i How much would 
yon give to see 1t ,:J 
WOULD YOU GIVE A PENNY? 
Would you give a penny a week to put the Peoples' 
Party on the Government Benehes ;i 
The Labonr Party is :fighting an uphill battle 
against terrific odds. The Press, the large Landowners, the 
. Banks and all the forces of organised wealth are combined 
against all classes of workers. Money is poured out like 
water to fight Labour, and i£ we are to change the system 
WE require the sinews of war. Our support~rs are not 
wealthy, therefore we ask for one penny per week and no 
more. Will you help ? · I£ you agree with us, please sign 
the attached. form and our collector will call on Saturday 
next for your :firi,;t contribution of one penny. 
NOTE : I£ more than one family in residence, please 
notify Secretary or Collector. 
D. Wouldes, Secretary, 
239 College Street 
I hereby promise to endeavour to contribute one penny 
per week to the local Branch of the New Zealand Labour 
Party as my effo1,t against the present oppressive Govern-
ment. 
Name ............................................................................................................................................... .. 
Address ................................................................................... , ...................................................... .. 
This is MY opportunity to make a practical protest 
against the. Coalition Government and it will cost ME one 
penny per week. I invite the collector to call on me on 
Saturday. 
H, 'v!edway, Printer, Main Str..i 
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APPENDIX B.3.. 
A typical extract ?rom the Labour newspaper 
acknowledging contributions. 
NATIONAL GAIVJPAIGN FUND. 
Previously a cknowl ed.ged . . . £732 
11W. K. 
" 
1 " .. 
Duntroon Branch ..... . 
11 G. R. 11 G er f? 8 
11P.D." ... . 
Methven Branch .... . 
C. W.R. Dixon, Palmerston South (tickets 
sold) • 
Brunner Branch (dance proceeds) ... 1 
Te Aroha Branch G G • 50 
£788 
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APPENDIX C. 2e 
R. R. W. BOTHA LEY 
Democrat Candidate 
For OTAKI 
MR. R. W. BOTHAMLEY 
-is a Barrister a11d §111Jc;:iior now• engaged in farming. 
-for many Yt;!IJ:~};J{if5'lfoe11 a member of the Makara County Council 
and Chairm~~~~fftwo yeli'ra. Mr. Bothamley is also a member of the 
Hutt Valle,y:i~le\'.trio Power Board and present Chairman. 
-is a meni.9cr ()f the Executive of the Wellington Returned Soldiers' 
Association'; and also a membe.r of the Executive of the Wellington 
Free Ambulance Board,· a member of the Executive of the Hutt• 
Makara Farmers' L'nion, and has served as a member of the Eitecu· 
tive of the S.P.C.A. and the Wellington Navy League. 
-Mr. Bothamley is un original and active member of the Royal 
Society for the l·!e.,ltl1 of \'1.:om .. n and Children of the Coastal Towns 
Branch. 
Vote Solidly for BOTHAM LEY 
Remember the "Wage. and Salary Cuts-
. £110,0.00.000 Tak~n in Five Years from the People's Income! 
, Remember O~d Age, Soldiers' and Widows' Pension Cuts-
They Spared Not the Aged, the Infirm or Returned Soldiers ! 
R.emem ber the Cut in Education Expenditure-
The 5-year-old Child Excluded from our Primary Schools~! 
Remember the Plight of the Unemployed- . 
58, 000 Suffering P overly in the Midst of Plenty ! 
· Remember the Hospital Board Expenditure Cuts-. 
Hospitals £200,000, Mental Institutions £70,000 Less Yearly! 
. Remember the Position of our Farmers-· 
45,000 Unable to Meet their Liabilities! 
Remember " Country cannot afford to go on paying for Social 
. Services " -Hon. R. Masters speaking to Businessmen, Wanganui, 
November 1, 1935. 
$afeguard Your Income ·and Social Services I 
NOT an ACT of 
PROVIDENCE! 
When New Zealand's Forbes-Coates plus Demo· 
crat Members Government decided to slash wa,ges 
and starve the people of New Zealand, New Zea· 
land's productivity. was at its highest level. 
Production in volume (as per Budget, 1935) 
was as follows:-··. 
1928-29 ................................. 100 
1929-30 ................................. 103 
1930-31 ................................. 108 




1933-34 ................................. 126 
Providence was never so bountiful. The skill 
of the human family. was never so apparent. The 
depression was not an act of God, but was a re-
fusal · on the !Part of men to use the bounty of 
Providence. 
The acreage of fruit was the highest on record 
at date of wage cuts. 
The acreage of tobacco was the highest. 
There were more cows, sheep, pigs - more 
work. But we cut wages. 
PROVIDENCE WAS MOST GENEROUS. 
FORBES-COATES WERE NIGGARDLY. 
Give Your Vote to LABOUR and 
Regain YOUR Standard of Living 
StandaiJ 'Prinllng Work• 
.APPENDIX O. V. 
ART UNION PROli1ITS. 
SOM~; INTERESTING PARTICULAmLQE ALLOCATIQNS. 
The Government promised early this year that the 
profits of future Art Unions would be used for 
National purposes only, but the recent allncation 
discloses the following grants to local Hall 
Committees in Mr. Coates's electo1->ate~-
Ke.ipara Plats Hall ••• 
Hukatere Hall • 0 • 
Makaura Hall e " • 
IV!areretu Hall 0 0 G 
Ta rars.eka Hall • 0 0 
Northern Wair•oa, Mi ti tai .Hall 










Seven Halls - six of them in the Kaipara Electorate -
. 
and one on the border.· The inference is clear 
NO PROMISE MADE BY THE GOVEHN1v1ENT CAN 
BE RELIED UPON! 
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0\-tvieclt~ Su::d~ . 
SOU'l'H IS I, AND 
I ···1m.,.1"'t:1 
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